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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, railway transport across Europe has
been fragmented in a number of national, vertically integrated and self-regulated
systems, each of which has its own structure and infrastructure. The railway sector
presents very diverse policy and regulatory aspects in each country; the diversifica-
tion between the various systems has been huge. For example, in the Iberian penin-
sula, the size of the gauge track (the space between the rails) was different from the
European standard, and there have been five different electrification systems across
the continent. At the international level, there was a strong tradition of inter-
company cooperation and associations.1
The railway sector also presents peculiarities from political and social points of view.
Firstly, this market is quite a complex one. Competition remains highly imperfect.
Networks must remain limited in number. Access is by definition restricted. Sunk
costs are enormous. Railways bring a reduction of collective nuisances which is not
taken into consideration by the pricing policy of the operators. The transport of
passengers is essentially local, and freight transport is essentially international.
Secondly, Member States remain highly cautious in this domain, since railways play
an essential role in local transports of passengers, and since the national companies
represent a huge volume of capital and personnel.
Railway policy has thus long been one of the slowest areas of European integration.
The first substantial railway directive was only issued in 1991, and the First Railway
Package in 2001. There have already been three legislative packages in this domain.
Though many Regulations and Directives have been adopted, the evolution of the
railway transport system remains slow. According to the Commission’s latest assess-
ments, the rail modal share for passenger transport remained fairly constant in the
EU between 1995 and 2010. For freight transport, it has substantially diminished
between 2000 and 2009.2 The opening of the markets remains fraught with various
difficulties, so in 2013 the European Commission proposed a fourth legislative
package, which has already provoked a lot of resistance.
To examine these questions, we first present a quick overview of the evolution of the
regulatory framework from the first railways Directive of 1991 to the three subse-
quent legislative packages of 2001, 2004 and 2007 (§ 1). Secondly, the innovations of
the proposals for the fourth package will be introduced (§ 2). Then, the evolution of
the European Railway Agency’s powers (§ 3), and the legal framework concerning
national subsidies will be analysed (§ 4). A list of all the measures adopted since the
1990s is provided in appendix (p. 57).
1 For a historical overview, see H. Stevens, Transport Policy in the European Union, Palgrave 2008; and CER,
European Railway Legislation Handbook, Eurail Press, second ed., 2008.
2 From 20% to 17% (Eurostat, Energy, transport and environment indicators, 2011, p. 89).
5INTRODUCTION
Railway policy has for a long time been among the slowest areas of European integra-
tion. The first substantial railway directive was issued only in 1991, and the First
Railway Package in 2001. This very cautious approach is explained by two main
factors. Firstly, the railway sector market is quite a complex one. It presents highly
imperfect opportunities for competition. Networks must remain limited in number.
Access is by definition restricted. Sunk costs are enormous. Railways bring a reduc-
tion of collective environmental nuisances which is not taken into consideration by
the pricing policy of operators. The transport of passengers is essentially local, and
freight transport is essentially international. Secondly, Member States remain highly
cautious in this domain, since railways play an essential role in local transports of
passengers, and since the national companies represent a huge volume of capital
and personnel.
Since 2001, however, the European legislator has enacted a series of ‘Railway
Packages’. At the beginning of 2013, the Commission proposed a fourth railway
package. EU railway policy has concentrated on three major areas which are crucial
for developing a strong and competitive rail transport industry: (1) opening the rail
transport market to competition, (2) improving the interoperability and safety of
national networks, and (3) developing rail transport infrastructure. This is a specific
adaptation of the sector to the traditional more competition/more harmonization
approach (in addition to the added financial support for the European networks
provided since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty).
Though many Regulations and Directives have been adopted, the evolution of the
railway transport system remains slow. According to the Commission’s latest assess-
ments, the rail modal share for passenger transport remained fairly constant in the
EU between 1995 and 2010.3 The freight transport share has substantially dimin-
ished between 2000 and 2009.4 The opening of the markets remains fraught with
various difficulties. This situation appears surprising, especially when one takes into
consideration the growing importance given by the EU to the reduction of green-
house gases in the fight against climate warming, and to the fight against air pollution
in general. An observer could thus wonder about the real impact of the EU measures.
The same could broadly be said about the railway industry. It remains quite
fragmented in Europe, and this situation is becoming increasingly dangerous. From
this point of view, the stakes for the Fourth Railway Package are extremely high.
To examine these questions, first, we give a quick overview of the evolution of the
regulatory framework, from the first railways Directive of 1991 to the three subse-
3 It has even slightly diminished from 6.6% to 6.3% (SWD(2013) 10, p. 3).
4 From 20% to 17% (Eurostat, Energy, transport and environment indicators, 2011, p. 89).
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quent legislative packages of 2001, 2004 and 2007 (§ 1). Secondly, the innovations of
the proposals for the fourth package will be introduced (§ 2). Then, the evolution of
the European Railway Agency’s (ERA) powers (§ 3), and the legal framework
concerning national subsidies will be analysed (§ 4). A list of all the measures
adopted since the 1990s is provided in appendix.
Franklin DEHOUSSE & Benedetta MARSICOLA5
5 F. Dehousse is professor (in abeyance) at the University of Liège and judge at the Court of Justice of the
European Union (General Court). B. Marsicola is assistant at the same General Court. This comment is
strictly personal. The text was updated until 30 November 2014.
71. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1.1. A very slow beginning
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, railway transport across Europe has
been fragmented into a number of national, vertically integrated and self-regulated
systems, each of which had its own structure and infrastructure. The railway sector
presented very diverse policy and regulatory aspects in each country; the diversifica-
tion between the various systems was huge. For example, in the Iberian peninsula,
the size of the gauge track (the space between the rails) was different from the
European standard, and there have been five separate electrification systems across
the continent. At the international level, there was a strong tradition of company
cooperation and associations.6
However, there was very little pressure, both on the governmental and entrepre-
neurial sides, to change the status quo, given that the existing systems guaranteed
the benefits of monopolistic economy in most countries. In addition, given that,
among other things, international train services only constituted (and still constitute)
a small portion of the total, there was little inclination to invest in them. Despite the
fact that the founding treaty aimed to develop a common transport policy, very little
legislation was adopted in the first decades of the existence of the Community.
Railway transport was exempt from the application of the competition rules from
early on, and state aid was considered compatible with the treaty in so far as it
compensated operators for the discharge of a public service.
At the end of the 1960s the situation started to change. Regulation 1017/687 elimi-
nated the exemption of the transport sector from the application of competition
rules, while exempting certain agreements, decisions and concerted practices from
the application of Article 101(1) of the TFEU. In 1969, the Council issued Regulation
1191/698 on action by Member States concerning the obligations inherent in the
concept of a public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway. The
Regulation required Member States to terminate all obligations inherent in the
concept of a public service in so far as they did not comply with the definition of being
essential in order to ensure the provision of adequate transport services. On the
other hand, the economic disadvantages of undertaking public services had to be
compensated. Regulation 1192/699 on common rules for the normalisation of the
accounts of railway undertakings, aimed to level the disparities between railway and
other modes of transport caused by the state aid received by the national railway
6 For an historical overview, see H. Stevens, Transport Policy in the European Union, Palgrave 2008; and CER,
European Railway Legislation Handbook, Eurail press, 2d ed., 2008.
7 OJ L 175, 23/07/1968 p. 1-12.
8 OJ L 156, 28/06/1969 p. 1-7.
9 OJ L 156, 28/06/1969 p. 8-20.
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undertakings. The following year, Regulation 1107/7010 on the granting of state aid
for transport by rail, road and inland waterway defined those cases and circum-
stances under which state aid would be compatible with the Treaty. Interestingly
enough, one of these requirements was subject to the termination condition that
common rules on the allocation of infrastructure costs entered into force. However,
despite the adoption of new legislation, governments found ways to keep on subsi-
dising their railways as much as they did before. The results the Commission had
anticipated were thus not achieved.11
1.2. Developments in the 1990s
The need for a change arose in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the rail sector under-
went a deep economic crisis when outperformed by truck and car transport. The
famous Commission white paper of 1985 on completing the internal market12 set the
first guidelines on the common European transport policy. Its programme aimed to
eliminate the obstacles to free access to land transport and to foster harmonization
of competition conditions. However, the fact that the Commission described its
approach to the Common Transport Policy as being not of direct relevance to the
internal market has to be stressed.13
Eventually, the Commission resolved to launch a set of proposals which could at least
initiate an internal market in rail services, and issued a first Communication on a
Community railway policy in 1989.14 One of the proposals culminated in Council
Directive 91/440/EEC15 of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community’s
railways. The Directive aimed to boost the efficiency of the railway system in order
to integrate it into a competitive market, affording railway enterprises the status of
independent operators in that market. It also promoted differentiation in manage-
ment, administration and internal control between the provision of transport
services and the operation of infrastructures. Member States retained general
responsibility for the infrastructures, had to manage the related payments on a non-
discriminatory basis and also ensure solid financial structures for publicly owned
undertakings. In addition, undertakings were encouraged to create international
groups of operators which would be mutually granted access to the infrastructures
of the other Member States on an equitable basis for the operation of international
transport.
All in all, Directive 91/440’s major innovation was the formal separation of manage-
ment from accounts of infrastructures and services. It enabled operators to run
10 OJ L 130, 15/06/1970 p. 1-3.
11 H. Stevens, Transport Policy in the European Union, cit. p. 95.
12 COM(1985) 310.
13 Ibidem, paragraph 112.
14 COM(1989) 564, JO C 34/08.
15 OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25-28.
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businesses on an essentially commercial basis, being charged for the use of infra-
structure and compensated for operating uneconomic services in the public interest.
This also made it possible for the huge debts of the national companies to be
imputed to the infrastructure entities, allowing the services branches to operate
commercially. In addition, with the use of infrastructure subject to fees and licences,
it was now theoretically possible for rail to compete on an equal footing with road.16
Even though the impact of the new provisions was modest, Member States had
finally acknowledged the possibility of applying market rules in the railway sector
and of mutually accessing each other’s infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way.17
This was a great innovation compared to the previous policy of cooperation among
monopoly providers.
A white paper18 was issued by the Commission in 1992 on the future development of
the Common Transport Policy, which expanded its scope beyond the Single Market,
adopting a global approach. Punctual initiatives concerning rail transport were
adopted in the years that followed. Namely, Directives 95/18/EC19 and 95/19/EC20
on licensing of railway undertakings and on the allocation of railway capacity and the
charging of infrastructure fees were adopted in 1995. The former measure did not
bring about much innovation; it required Member States to establish licensing bodies
setting some general standards, but then only allowed undertakings incorporated in
the relevant state to apply for the licences. The latter Directive required Member
States to establish allocation bodies that should operate in a non-discriminatory way
(except for some allowed prioritizations, for example, for public services) and that
charges should also be imposed without discrimination.
In the mid-1990s it was thus the case that, other than the well-established arrange-
ments for international cooperation, very few cross-border services were author-
ized. However, in 1996, following a persistent crisis in the railway sector, the need
for more specific action emerged and a new white paper on a strategy for revitalising
the Community’s railways21 was issued. It focused on the opening up of the interna-
tional freight market. The arrangements of the freight sector were so bad that in
2001 the average speed of cross-border freight services still only amounted to 18
km/h (or 40 km/h).22 The new initiatives were thus mainly addressed at the rail
freight market.
16 See H. Stevens, Transport Policy in the European Union, cit.
17 See F. Dehousse, C. Thiry and P. Van den Brûle, ‘Vers le marché unique des transports ferroviaires: les avan-
tages et les dangers de la stratégie européenne’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. LVII, 2004, No 2.
18 Document drawn up on the basis of COM(92) 494 final.
19 OJ L 28, 7.2.1995, p. 8-9.
20 OJ L 143, 27.6.1995, p. 75-78.
21 COM(1996) 421.
22 H. Stevens, Transport Policy in the European Union, op. cit., p. 99. The 18 km/h has been contested by the
operators, who consider this is too negative and far from the average.
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The same year, Directive 96/48/EC23 on the interoperability of the European high-
speed network was adopted. It entered into force in 2002 with a view to enabling
operators to use the systems in other Member States. The strategy was to introduce
more competition and harmonization in a new, developing segment of the market.
The high speed segment encountered less reluctance concerning standardization, as
infrastructure had to be created from scratch rather than adapted, making the
embrace of a common approach less complicated. Interoperability, in ensuring
harmonized standards for infrastructure, equipment and rolling stock, would consti-
tute a major contribution to the transport policy in the Single Market. The Directive
was subsequently amended in 2001 and 2004.
Efforts to improve interoperability, in particular thanks to the creation of harmonized
specifications and standards, have also facilitated the creation of the Trans-European
Transport Network (TEN-T).24 The Trans-European Transport Network Executive
Agency (TEN-T EA), established in 2006,25 has the task of realizing the technical and
financial implementation of the TEN-T programme.
In the 2001 White Paper for European transport policy for 2010: the emphasis was
placed on the need to ensure competition within and among the means of transport
and to enhance intermodality. A number of structural problems were identified and
the priority of opening the markets was established, not only for international goods
transport, but also for cabotage and progressively for international passenger trans-
port as well, together with harmonization for interoperability and safety. The main
target for the Commission, to be achieved with a series of actions in the run up to
2010, was to create a real single market for rail transport, placing users’ needs at the
heart of the strategy. In order to achieve these objectives, three ‘railway packages’
were adopted in 2001, 2004 and 2007 respectively. The fourth package, proposed in
2013 and currently debated by the EU legislative authorities, aims to complete them.
1.3. The Railway Packages adopted
In a nutshell, the First Railway Package (2001) established the basis for the current
regulatory system. It required the creation of regulatory bodies, imposed accounts
separation, and opened the international freight market to competition. The second
package (2004) consolidated these bases. It created the European Railway Agency
(ERA) and additionally opened the national freight markets. The third package (2007)
began to deal with passenger transport and opened the international passenger
23 OJ L 235, 17.9.1996, p. 6-24.
24 Trans-European Networks, in the areas of transport, telecommunication and energy, were provided by the
Treaty of Maastricht as a means of fostering the establishment of an area without internal frontiers. Action
by the Community should aim to promote the interconnection and interoperability of national networks as
well as access to such networks.
25 Commission Decision 2007/60/EC of 26 October 2006 establishing the Trans-European Transport Network
Executive Agency pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p. 88-90.
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market. It also harmonized some aspects of passengers’ rights and the certification
of train drivers. Finally, the recast (2012) reinforced the first package through more
separation of accounts and more independence of network management.
1.3.1. The First Railway Package (2001)
The First Railway Package (informally known as the ‘infrastructure package’) was
proposed by the Commission in 1998 and adopted in 2001. It has been recast by
Directive 2012/34/EU.26 It aimed to enable rail operators to access the trans-
European network on a non-discriminatory basis, to open the international rail
freight market to competition and to ensure an efficient use of the infrastructures.
The Commission had the general objective of increasing competition in the rail
sector, which, despite a slight growth in absolute terms, was still losing market
share.27 The package was composed of three Directives.
The first was Directive 2001/12/EC28 on the development of the Community’s
railways. It sought to introduce a wider framework for competition among railway
companies in the international freight market. This competition was limited at the
beginning to the Trans-European Rail Freight Network, and at a later stage (2008,
anticipated for 2007) extended to the entire network. The Directive set the require-
ments concerning the relationship between the state and the infrastructure
manager on the one hand, and between the infrastructure manager and railway
undertakings on the other hand. In particular, it singled out some essential functions,
such as granting licences and deciding on allocation and charges, which could not be
carried out by any entity or firm providing rail transport services. However, it still
allowed vertically integrated companies to continue to operate. It required separate
accounting for freight and passenger services.
The second, Directive 2001/13/EC,29 amending Directive 95/18, set out the condi-
tions for freight operators to be granted a licence to operate services on the
European rail network, extending the validity of licences throughout the Community.
It specified that licencing bodies had to be independent from rail transport undertak-
ings, hence they should not be service providers. The aim of the Commission, by the
introduction of this Directive, was to progressively create a ‘one-stop shop’ to market
freeways.
Finally, Directive 2001/14/EC30 replaced Directive 95/12 on the allocation and
charging for infrastructure and safety certification. It was intended to increase trans-
parency and ensure that charges were levied and allocation of train path was carried
26 OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32-77.
27 See CER, European Railway Legislation Handbook, cit. p. 30.
28 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 1-25.
29 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 29-46.
30 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 26-28.
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out in an economic and non-discriminatory way. Infrastructure managers were
required to develop and publish network statements publicising all the information
needed by those who were willing to run services. In addition, Member States were
required to establish independent regulatory bodies in charge of overseeing the
application of rules about charges, allocation, and safety certification. These bodies
were meant to decide on appeals based on unfair treatment, discrimination or other
grievances. Member States were to ensure that, in normal conditions, the accounts
of infrastructure management at least balanced income with infrastructure expend-
iture, while the manager would have incentives to reduce the costs of infrastructure
provision and the level of the charges. Charges were set to offset external costs, such
as pollution, between modes.
A few weeks later, Directive 2001/16/EC31 on the interoperability of the trans-
European conventional rail system was adopted, taking further steps towards the
progressive harmonization of technical and operational standards across the EU. It
completed the framework introduced by Directive 96/48 covering the high speed
network. For the first time it explicitly took into consideration the environmental
implications of the scarce use of railways (according to the Kyoto Protocol require-
ments),32 and aimed to improve compatibility between the characteristics of the
infrastructure and those of the rolling stock, as well as efficient interconnection of
the information and communication systems of the different infrastructures. As is
stated in one of the recitals, performance levels, safety, quality of service and cost
depend upon such compatibility and interconnection, as does, in particular, the
interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system. In particular, the
Directive, albeit with several exceptions, allows that each of the subsystems should
be covered by a Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI),33 and that Member
States should ensure that interoperability constituents are placed on the market only
if they enable interoperability to be achieved within the trans-European conven-
tional rail system, while at the same time meeting the essential requirements. Those
interoperability constituents which bear the ‘EC’ declaration of conformity or suita-
bility for use should be considered as complying.
Compliance with the first package’s measures presented serious shortcomings in
most of the Member States. In 2008 – the transposition period having expired in
2003 – 24 infringement proceedings were initiated by the Commission, 13 of which
resulted in cases before the European Court of Justice.34 The main problems
31 OJ L 110, 20.4.2001, p. 1-273.
32 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations 1998,
information available on the UNFCCC website http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
33 See Art. 2(g) of Directive 2001/16/EC: ‘“technical specifications for interoperability”, hereinafter referred to
as TSIs, means the specifications by which each subsystem or part subsystem is covered in order to meet
the essential requirements and ensure the interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system.’
34 In particular, Hungary, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy have recently been found in violation of its
provisions: Cases C-473/10; C-483/10; C-545/10, C-627/10 and C-369/11 respectively.
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detected were: the lack of independence between the infrastructure managers and
the railway undertakings, the inadequate regulation of national authorities and of
the fixation of charges.35
Although in the last part of the 1990s the railway sector underwent significant
growth, it did not improve its market share, which was especially low for the
passenger market. The Commission, therefore, with a view to revitalizing the
railways sector and preventing it from losing further market share, launched a
second railway package.36
1.3.2. The Second Railway Package
Standardization lay at the core of the Second Railway Package in 2004. Composed of
three Directives and one Regulation, it accelerated the liberalization of rail freight
services by fully opening the rail freight market to competition from 1 January 2007.
The ERA was established in Valenciennes (France) with the aim of developing safety
and interoperability in the European rail system and supporting the implementation
of community legislation. In addition, the package introduced common procedures
for accident investigation and provided for safety authorities to be created in each
Member State. A further proposal on international passenger services was ultimately
not agreed upon.
Additionally, the package included a Commission recommendation for the accession
of the EU to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF),37
which only entered into force in July 2011.38 COTIF is an inter-governmental agree-
ment between 41 countries which provides a system of international law for the
carriage of goods, passengers and luggage by rail on international journeys. In
particular, COTIF aims to reduce transaction costs and ensure certainty as to the
rights and obligations of the different parties who may be involved in international
passenger or freight transport.
The first Directive 2004/49/EC39 of 29 April 2004 (the ‘Railway Safety Directive’),
amending Directive 95/18/EC and Directive 2001/14/EC, aimed to define common
safety objectives for the entire EU railway system. It requires Member States to
ensure that safety rules are laid down, applied and enforced in an open and non-
discriminatory manner, with the possibility for the Commission to suspend the
35 See J. M. Miguèl Medina, ‘Revisión del marco jurídico comunitario del ferrocarril. La Directiva refundición’.
Revista de Derecho de la Unión Europea, No 25, 2013.
36 CER, European Railway Legislation Handbook, cit. p. 37.
37 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the conditions for
Community accession to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980, as
amended by the Vilnius Protocol of 3 June 1999 (COM(2002) 24 final – not published in the OJ).
38 See European Commission Press Release –Transport: EU to join international rail organization, available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-784_en.htm.
39 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 44-113.
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implementation of national safety rules in case of serious doubts as to their compat-
ibility with Community legislation. It creates a clear procedure for issuing safety
certificates that rail companies have to acquire in order to be able to operate on the
European network. In addition, it introduces the principle of independent accident
investigation, which has to be conducted in each Member State by a permanent
body, and sets some requirements for staff training and access to training facilities.
The second Directive, 2004/50/EC40 of 29 April 2004, unifies the rules on interoper-
ability of high speed railways and of the standards system, amending Directives 96/
48 and 2001/16. The scope of the provisions is extended to include the entire
European conventional railway network, both conventional and high speed. It also
establishes the conditions, in the form of TSIs drafted under the responsibility of the
ERA, to achieve the interoperability of the trans-European railway network within
the Community, with the possibility of making exceptions. Each constituent is
required to have a certificate of conformity to all the relevant TSI and an identifica-
tion code for safety reasons. All the identification codes should be logged in a register
available for consultation by other Member States.
The third Directive 2004/51/EC41 of 29 April 2004, amending Directive 1991/440,
provided full liberalization of freight from 1 January 2007. It has been repealed by
Directive 2012/34/EU.
Finally, Regulation 881/2004/EC42 of 29 April 2004 established the ERA to develop
railway safety and interoperability. The agency mainly drafts TSIs and addresses
recommendations and opinions to the Commission. Until now, it has only been
entrusted with limited powers (see § 3 for further detail).
Since 2001, the results of the liberalization and harmonization have started to show
some encouraging signals. For example, the modal share of rail freight slightly
increased and the undertakings showed a growth in productivity. By 2008, one year
after the full opening of the freight market, an increase in competition could also be
observed, especially in those countries where the market opening process had
started on an earlier date.43
1.3.3. The Third Railway Package
It took quite some time and effort before the proposals set forth by the Commission
in 2004 in the framework of the Third Railway Package were adopted. Agreement
was finally reached in October 2007. The package introduced open access rights for
international rail passenger services by 2010. This liberalization was extended to
40 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 114-163.
41 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 164-17.2
42 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 1-43.
43 CER, European Railway Legislation Handbook, cit. p. 43-44.
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include ‘cabotage’, meaning that operators may pick up and set down passengers at
any station, including those located in the same Member State. Furthermore, it intro-
duced a ‘European driving licence’ for train drivers, allowing them to circulate on the
entire European network. Finally, the new package aimed to strengthen passengers’
rights. In particular, minimum quality standards (non-discrimination against handi-
capped travellers or persons with reduced mobility, liability in case of accidents,
availability of train tickets, and personal security of passengers in stations) were
guaranteed to all passengers on all lines, and long-distance travellers were assured a
wider range of rights. A further proposal on compensation in cases of non-compli-
ance with contractual quality requirements for rail freight services was not ultimately
adopted, mainly due to pressure from stakeholders. Four measures were adopted.
The first of them is Regulation 1370/2007/EC44 of 23 October 2007, concerning
public passenger transport services by rail and by road, repealing Regulations 1191/
69 and 1107/70. It sets down the conditions under which the competent authorities
were required to conclude public service contracts with the operators to whom they
granted an exclusive right and/or compensation in exchange for discharging public
service obligations (PSOs).45 The duration of public service contracts was given upper
thresholds by the Regulation. It also established rules for the awarding of the PSOs
by means of transparent and non-discriminatory competitive procedures which
might be subject to negotiation. Low level or budget contracts were, however,
exempt from these rules. Member States should provide the Commission with all the
information necessary to determine whether the compensation allocated is compat-
ible with this Regulation. Member States were meant to implement the Regulation
gradually, as the end of the transition period was fixed at December 2019.
Regulation 1371/2007/EC46 of 23 October 2007 on rail passenger rights and obliga-
tions was the second measure, setting out minimum quality standards that should be
guaranteed to all passengers on all lines. The Regulation was mainly built on the
existing international law system of COTIF. It established rules concerning informa-
tion, both before and during the journey, to be provided by railway undertakings, the
issuing of tickets and the adaptation of computerized systems. Undertakings must be
insured for their liability towards passengers in the event of an accident. On the
other side, the regulation strengthens the safeguards for passengers to get compen-
sation and assistance in the event of delay, misconnection or cancellation of a
44 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p.1-13.
45 For a definition, see Art. 2(i): ‘“public service contract” means one or more legally binding acts confirming
the agreement between a competent authority and a public service operator to entrust to that public
service operator the management and operation of public passenger transport services subject to public
service obligations; depending on the law of the Member State, the contract may also consist of a decision
adopted by the competent authority:
– taking the form of an individual legislative or regulatory act, or
– containing conditions under which the competent authority itself provides the services or entrusts the
provision of such services to an internal operator.’
46 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p.14-41.
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service. It also provides special rules for disabled and reduced-mobility people.
Member States were allowed special arrangements for the entry into force of the
provisions.
In 2013, the Commission issued a report47 on the implementation of this regulation.
According to this report, while the protection of rail passengers has improved since
the Regulation became applicable, around 61% of all national long distance services
and 83% of regional and suburban services were not yet applying the full range of rail
passenger rights. This was due to the fact that Member States largely opted for
transitional periods and exemptions. This practice is likely to become an obstacle to
the achievement of a complete rail passenger rights regime in the EU.
The third measure is Directive 2007/58/EC48 of 23 October 2007, on market opening
for international rail passenger services. It amended Directives 440/1991 and 2001/
14. Member States were still free to limit the right of access related to the picking up
and setting down of passengers within the same Member State where the interna-
tional route was also covered by one or more national public service contracts. In
addition, conditions for the grant of levies on passenger services were set. This Direc-
tive has been partially repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU, a recast of the first
package.
Finally, Directive 2007/59/EC49 of 23 October 2007 concerns the certification of train
drivers. It harmonizes train driver certification within the EU with the aim of fostering
safety. It lays down the procedures for obtaining and withdrawing licences and certif-
icates as well as specifying the tasks to be carried out by the competent authorities
in EU countries. By October 2018, all train drivers should hold licences and certifi-
cates in conformity with this Directive.
1.3.4. The Recast Directive 2012/34/EU on the European Railway 
Area
In 2008, a recast of the texts concerning railway interoperability was made by Direc-
tive 2008/57/EC.50 The new Directive established the conditions to be met to achieve
interoperability within the Community rail system. In particular, it regrouped the
procedures for developing the technical specifications for interoperability
concerning conventional and high speed rail. It also clarified the relationship
between TSIs and European standards. The conditions encompass the design,
construction, placing in service, upgrading, renewal, operation and maintenance of
47 COM(2013) 587.
48 OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 44-50.
49 OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 51-78.
50 OJ L 191, 18.7.2008, p. 1-45.
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the parts of this system as well as the professional qualifications and health and
safety conditions of the staff who contribute to its operation and maintenance.
In 2010, following a European Parliament Resolution51 which stressed the shortcom-
ings in the application of the First Railway Package in the Member States and the lack
of effectiveness of its measures, the Commission made a proposal to recast the
package. The purpose was to improve the transparency of rail market access condi-
tions and access to rail-related services – for example, station, freight and mainte-
nance facilities. A merging of the first three Directives of the package was proposed,
along with the clarification of some of the terminology and an update for the legisla-
tion to accommodate new market conditions.52 In its turn, the recast Directive,
whose transposition time elapses in June 2015, is already subject to the amendment
proposals of the Fourth Railway Package.
The main objectives of the Recast were largely focused on three areas: firstly, compe-
tition issues and the need to improve transparency of the rail market access condi-
tions; secondly, strengthening the power of national rail regulators and establishing
the obligation on these bodies to cooperate with their counterparts on cross-border
issues; thirdly, supporting the financial structure to encourage investment.53 Direc-
tive 2012/34/EU54 thus establishes a single European railway area.
The efforts of the Commission to put forward proposals to enhance competition in
the transport sector had led to the adoption in 2011 of a new white paper,55
conceived as a roadmap, which included 40 concrete initiatives to create a true single
European transport area through a competitive and efficient transport system. For
the railways sector, the major objectives were the creation of a real internal market
for rail transport and the increase of the modal share of rail transport in the market.
1.4. A global appraisal until 2013
What have the consequences of the EU regulatory changes been for the railway
sector? This is a difficult question, and it has continued to be much debated until
now. The sector is, of course, characterized by strong network effects. It is also
divided into different segments and sub-segments. Freight traffic is essentially inter-
national; passenger traffic is mainly national. Interoperability across national borders
remains a huge challenge in many aspects. From an economic point of view, it is
certainly difficult to find the correct balance in regulation.
51 Resolution of the European Parliament of 17 June 201O, JO C 236 of 12.08.2011.
52 See L. Butcher, Railways: EU Policy, Standard note of the House of Commons Library, February 2013, avail-
able at: http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00184, p. 7.
53 See ibidem.
54 OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32-77.
55 COM/2011/0144 final.
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Environmental considerations make it still more difficult. Railway transport, as
opposed to road transport, benefits from weak externalities. This is, however, diffi-
cult to reflect because environmental externalities are not correctly priced. Further-
more, the infrastructure costs are not similarly accounted for in rail transport and
road transport. Finally, CO2 pricing remains far too weak. There can be no fair compe-
tition as long as externalities are not taken into consideration. From this point of
view, there remains some imbalance in the present EU railway regulatory frame-
work.
In this context, it is extremely interesting to read the Opinion of the European
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) concerning the Fourth Railway Package:
‘A review of the statistical data provided by the Commission … shows that
there is no automatic correlation between this separation, the opening-up of
the market and improved railway results, but the latter would appear to be
linked directly to funding levels and toll prices. Furthermore, the McNulty
report provides a very mixed picture of the situation in the United Kingdom,
recognising that the UK rail system is proving to be more costly both for the
State and for the user, and suffers as a result of the various stakeholders not
being aligned, which requires greater State involvement in bringing the
different aspects into line (such as charges, distribution, timetabling, etc.),
which is essential. … The above observations lead the EESC, despite the
obvious need for market reform, to suggest that the Commission adopt a
prudent approach to the liberalisation of domestic passenger traffic, in the
light of the current experience of the liberalisation of international traffic. …
the inadequacy of the results of the proposed solutions is clear, particularly
because in the absence of adequate investment and a suitable political
impetus, the market cannot address the issues raised. However, ensuring that
areas on the fringes of national territories are served by modern, environ-
mentally-friendly means of transport is a particular issue here.’56
56 EESC, Fourth Railway Package, TEN/505, 11 July 2013, §§ 5, 20 and 22.
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2. THE FOURTH PACKAGE PROPOSALS
In 2013, the European railways formed an internal market that was still highly
fragmented, and the openness of the national markets varied considerably. Diver-
gences concerning the system’s efficiency and the consumers’ satisfaction were
also growing. Competition levels were still low and access to the market was
characterized by discrimination and excessive bureaucracy. Despite being one of
the most environmentally friendly modes of transport, rail only covered 6% of the
passenger transport market share, and consumer satisfaction across the EU was
poor.
The proposals for a Fourth Railway Package, presented by the Commission in
January 2013, are to be framed within this context. This new package consists of
three Directives57 and three Regulations,58 along with a general communication,
three impact assessments, three reports and three Staff Working Documents59. Its
overall objective is to enhance the quality and efficiency of rail services by
removing any remaining legal, institutional and technical obstacles, and fostering
the performance of the railway sector and its competitiveness, in order to further
develop the single European railway area. Its object can be grouped in three
‘pillars’. The technical pillar covers rail interoperability and safety under the
responsibility of a strengthened ERA. The liberalization pillar is meant to open the
domestic passenger markets by granting access to all operators and introducing
mandatory tendering from December 2019. The infrastructure pillar aims to
improve the structures and governance for infrastructure managers, in particular
by introducing a (tempered) obligation to unbundle infrastructure managers from
services operators.
According to the Commission, the opening of the market should generate new and
better jobs, and give Member States the possibility to protect workers by requiring
57 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast),
COM(2013) 31 final; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interop-
erability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast), COM(2013) 30 final; Proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening
of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infra-
structure, COM(2013) 29 final.
58 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council repealing Regulation (EEC) No
1192/69 of the Council on common rules for the normalisation of the accounts of railway undertakings,
COM(2013) 26 final; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport
services by rail, COM(2013) 28 final; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regulation (EC) No 881/2004,
COM(2013) 27 final.
59 All the documents are available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/packages/2013_en.htm.
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new contractors to take them on when public service contracts are transferred,
which goes beyond the general EU requirements on transfers of undertakings.60
2.1. The technical pillar – ERA as an authorization body
The adoption of the technical pillar is expected to increase economies of scale for
railway undertakings across the EU, reduce administrative costs and speed up proce-
dures. It should also help to avoid any covert discrimination in the issuing of safety
certificates and vehicle authorizations.61 The current problems can be illustrated by
the enormous variations among the Member States in the fees required for the
operators’ safety certificates (from nothing to €70,000). The same applies to vehicle
authorizations. This kind of procedure can additionally be very time consuming,
taking up to two years in some cases. The amount and legal status of the human
resources dedicated to this task are particularly varied. Consequently, huge assets
are currently immobilized and investments are certainly not encouraged.62
To put an end to the diversification of authorizations and safety certificates proce-
dures, the proposal aims to give the ERA new powers. It would become a ‘one-stop
shop’ issuing single (EU-wide) authorizations for placing vehicles on the market as
well as single safety certificates for operators. This is achieved by three legislative
actions: a proposal to amend Regulation 881/2004 establishing an ERA, another one
recasting the interoperability legislation, and one amending Directive 2004/49/EC on
safety of the EU railways. Concerning safety, the proposals also aim to ensure that
risk controls are duly implemented, due to the possible worsening of these controls
as a consequence of the fragmentation of the responsibilities and the recurrent
recourse to outsourcing.
According to the Commission, the proposed measures pursue a 20% reduction in the
time to market for new railway undertakings and a 20% reduction in the cost and
duration of the authorization of rolling stock. Overall, this is supposed to lead to a
saving for companies of €500 million by 2025.63
60 On the Fourth Railway Package in general, see: Commissioner Siim Kallas’ note of 30 January 2013 ‘Euro-
pean Railways at a Junction: the Commission Adopts Proposals for a Fourth Railway Package’ available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kallas/headlines/news/2013/01/fourth-railway-package_en;
and Slides by O. Coppens (European Commission, DG MOVE): The Fourth Railway Package presented at the
Danish Railway Conference 2013, available at http://www.banekonference.dk/sites/default/files/slides/8/
13_2_4_4RP%20Copenhagen_0.pdf.
61 See: Council reaches political agreement on railway interoperability and safety and the European Railway
Agency, Council Press Release 1401/14, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressdata/en/trans/143080.pdf.
62 See: Commission SWD Impact Assessment Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Railways and repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 881/2004 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the inter-
operability of the rail system within the European Union (Recast) Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast) / SWD/2013/08 final.
63 Commissioner Siim Kallas’ note of 30 January 2013 ‘European Railways at a Junction: the Commission
Adopts Proposals for a Fourth Railway Package’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/
kallas/headlines/news/2013/01/fourth-railway-package_en.
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It is interesting to notice that nobody is at present defending a system of mutual
recognition of national authorizations and safety certificates. Theoretically, this
could be an option. However, its general neglect seems to reflect a broad lack of trust
in the decisions taken in other Member States. This lack of trust comes partly from
the hidden protectionist thrust of a lot of national decisions. Hence the absolute
need to boost the powers of the ERA.
2.2. The opening of domestic passenger transport
According to the impact assessment to the proposal to amend the Recast First
Package Directive 2012/34,64 national domestic passenger markets remain largely
closed. Moreover, the great majority of domestic passenger services are not
provided under a commercial basis but under public service contracts.65 ‘Directly
awarded public service contracts constitute 42% of all EU passenger-kilometres,
contributing to the fact that in 16 out of 25 member States with rail, the incumbent
holds above 90% market share.’66 Former Commissioner Kallas has also explained
that, in the markets which are open, improvements in quality and availability of
services have been observed, along with passenger satisfaction and growth, to rise
year on year, amounting in some cases to over 50% over ten years.67
The fourth package proposals – namely the one68 to amend Directive 2012/34 and
the one69 to amend Regulation 1370/2007 – intend to open the access for all EU
operators on all domestic passenger markets. Year 2019 is maintained as the date
from which competitive tendering will be compulsory, but the exceptions to this rule
are circumscribed. Companies should thus be able to offer domestic rail passenger
services across the EU: either by offering competing commercial services within the
market, or through bidding for public service rail contracts.
In particular, according to the proposal70 to amend Directive 2012/34, railway under-
takings should be guaranteed open access for the purpose of operating domestic
passenger services, which comes as a major innovation. This opening up is subject to
the possibility of restrictions when the economic equilibrium of a public service
64 Commission SWD, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening of the
market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infrastructure
(COM(2013) 29 final); (SWD(2013) 13 final), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUr-
iServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0012:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 66.
65 COM(2013) 28 final.
66 COM(2013) 25 final, p. 6-7.
67 Commissioner Siim Kallas’ note of 30 January 2013 ‘European Railways at a Junction: the Commission
Adopts Proposals for a Fourth Railway Package’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/
kallas/headlines/news/2013/01/fourth-railway-package_en.
68 COM(2013) 29 final.
69 COM(2013) 28 final.
70 COM(2013) 29 final.
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contract is compromised. The relevant test should be carried out by national regula-
tory bodies, as is currently the case for international services. The proposal also
enables Member States to establish information exchange and integrated ticketing
schemes common to all railway undertakings operating domestic passenger services,
provided that competition is not distorted. In addition, it provides for the adoption
of coordinated contingency plans by railway undertakings to provide assistance to
passengers in case of a major disruption of traffic.
The proposal to amend Regulation 1370/2007 introduces public tendering as the
general rule for the allocation of public service contracts starting from 2019. Direct
award would only be permitted for small-scale contracts. The proposal provides for
a procedure for defining PSOs and the geographical scope of public service contracts.
It requires competent authorities to establish public transport plans in order to
define the objectives of public passenger transport policy and supply, and perfor-
mance patterns for public passenger transport. In addition, it sets in a flexible
manner a threshold for the maximum volume of passenger transport by rail under
each public service contract. In so far as rolling stock is concerned, the proposal intro-
duces an obligation for Member States to ensure effective and non-discriminatory
access to suitable rolling stock for operators:71
‘The proposals seek to increase passengers’ benefits, in terms of improved
services and choice. Combined with structural reforms, they aim, in the view
of the Commission, to produce more than 40 billion of financial benefits for
citizens and companies involved by 2035 and would allow provision of up to
about 16 billion additional passenger/km according to Commission esti-
mates.’72
In this regard, however, the research services of the European Parliament have
detected important defects in the impact assessment:
‘DG MOVE admits that quantification of the impacts of market opening is very
challenging and “results [of an attempt to quantify impacts on investments,
profits and public savings] were rather illustrative estimates with up to 50%
uncertainty range” (Impact Assessment or IA, p. 58), because Member States
have different baseline situations, experience of market liberalisation is
limited and exogenous factors affecting the passenger rail demand are uncer-
tain. But the qualitative analysis shows deficiencies, too. While the results of
stakeholder consultations and experiences from Member States are continu-
ously referred to, the argumentation of the IA lacks a foundation of scientific
evidence. Assumed impacts of the different options are well illustrated and
described, but the reasoning as to why these impacts occur as a result of a
71 See infra, § 4.4.
72 Commissioner Siim Kallas’ note of 30 January 2013, cit.
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specific policy does not appear to be based on facts, academic literature or
existing evidence. Especially the assumed reduction in costs of RUs as a result
of market opening is not science-based or further explained in detail. Hence,
DG MOVE has to admit that “there is a certain degree of uncertainty in the
assessment of impacts of some options, as some evidence for instance is fairly
recent (competition in the market in open access services) and sometimes
ambiguous (evidence is provided only by specific stakeholders)” and that
therefore “the choice to move forward with the aforementioned combination
remains a political choice” (IA, p. 100). Moreover, some of the charts
presented in the IA are illegible.’73
2.3. Infrastructure governance and separation
The third pillar of the proposed reform concerns the institutional separation (‘unbun-
dling’) between infrastructure management and rail services operators. It is intro-
duced through a proposal74 amending the Recast First Package Directive 2012/34.
Rail undertakings, independent of infrastructure managers, should have immediate
access to the internal passenger market by 2019.
The proposal aims to strengthen infrastructure managers so that they can control all
the functions at the heart of the rail network. To that end, it sets out all the relevant
functions of infrastructure management that are to be performed in a unified way.
The proposal creates a forum for the cooperation of infrastructure managers across
borders, with a view to developing the European rail network. This includes cooper-
ation on the establishment of the core network corridors, the rail freight corridors
and the implementation of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
deployment plan.
The ERTMS is a system for the standardization of rail signalling. It was developed as
a ‘major European industrial project’ by eight UNIFE (Association of the European
Rail Industry) members in cooperation with the EU, railway stakeholders and the
Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway (GSM-R) industry. It is composed
of two parts. The first is the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is in turn
divided into two modules, namely track and train. It allows data transmission in the
cabin from the rail signalling system and further data processing by the on-board
computers. The second part is the GSM-R, a radio system providing for the exchange
of information between the track and the train. It is based on the standards applied
to the public GSM network and also covers both trackside and on-board equipment.
The ERTMS is intended to replace the – currently more than 20 – national train
control and command systems with a unique system fully interoperable across the
73 Doc. 508.962, p. 13.
74 COM(2013) 29 final.
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EU, with the ultimate target of improving the competitiveness of the rail sector. The
project was initiated in the 1980s through a series of projects financially and techni-
cally backed by the Commission.75 Directive 96/48/EC76 (interoperability Directive) –
now recast by Directive 2008/57/EC77 – provides that compliance with the system is
one of the basic parameters that the TSIs should respect to meet the essential
requirements to achieve interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail
system.78
The introduction of the institutional separation of the infrastructure manager from
transport undertakings would operate by prohibiting the same legal or natural
person from having the right to control or exercise influence over an infrastructure
manager and a railway undertaking at the same time.
However, this requirement allows for a number of exceptions. Member States
should have the possibility of being the owners of both legal entities, while control
should be exercised by public authorities that are separate and legally distinct from
each other. In addition, the proposal allows vertically integrated undertakings,
including those with a holding structure, to maintain ownership of the infrastructure
manager. Nonetheless, it is clarified that this is only permissible if certain conditions
are fulfilled ensuring that the infrastructure manager is fully independent and has
effective decision-making rights for all its functions. This control system has been
called the ‘Chinese walls’ and is somewhat based on the Independent Transmission
75 More specific information at ERTMS website, ERTMS History section: http://www.ertms.net/?page_id=49.
76 OJ L 235, 17/09/1996, p. 6-24.
77 OJ L 191, 18.7.2008, p. 1-45.
78 In 2001 the Commission issued Decision 2001/260/EC, notified under document number C(2001) 746 ‘on
the basic parameters of the command-control and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high-speed
rail system referred to as “ERTMS characteristics” in Annex II(3) to Directive 96/48/EC.’ The Decision gave a
definition of the ERTMS and established that the basis for the control-command and signalling subsystem
shall be the set of specifications listed thereafter. The specifications could be revised after the ERMTS
master plan pilot tests; such a revision was prepared by the joint representative body (the AEIF at the time)
under a change control procedure, then submitted to the Committee as provided in Art. 6 of Directive 96/
48/EC. It required that the specifications should be available online or from the EC services on request.
The ‘Agency Regulation’ 881/2004/EC (as amended by Regulation 1335/2008/EC) provides that the ERA
shall act as the system authority for ERTMS project, in the sense that it is responsible for the organization
and the process of the change control management.
The development of the ERTMS specifications is taken over by the ERA, but the drafting is done in close
cooperation with both European Railways (gathered in the ERTMS users’ group) and the rail industry (under
the umbrella of UNISIG).
On the basis of the interoperability Directive, the Commission has issued a series of Decisions, based on ERA
recommendations, concerning the TSIs relating to the control command and signalling subsystems of the
trans-European rail system, the latest of which is Commission Decision 2012/691/EU of 6 November 2012,
amending Commission Decision 2012/88/EU (OJ L 311 of 10.11.2012, p. 3-13).
In 2005 the Commission issued a Communication on the deployment of the European rail signalling system
ERTMS/ETCS (COM(2005) 298). In 2005 and then in 2008, the Commission and the representatives of the
European Railway sector signed two successive dedicated Memorandums of Understanding concerning the
strengthening of cooperation for speeding up the deployment of ERTMS.
The Commission has created a dedicated ERTMS Memorandum of Understanding Steering Committee,
which gathers the signatories of the Memorandum. In addition, it has appointed a European ERTMS Coordi-
nator, Karel Vinck. Partly because of the instability of the ERTMS standards, due to the possibility of filing
change requests, some Member States have been reluctant to adopt them. However, the system has also
been adopted outside Europe.
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Operator-ITO model in energy. These safeguards should be in place with regard to
the structure of the undertaking, including the separation of financial circuits
between the infrastructure manager and other companies of the integrated group,
and also the setting out of rules on the management structure of the infrastructure
manager.79
A further safeguard is provided by the provision that, through a ‘procedure of verifi-
cation of compliance’, ‘upon request of a Member State or on its own initiative, the
Commission shall decide whether infrastructure managers which are part of a verti-
cally integrated undertaking fulfil the requirements set by the Directive and whether
the implementation of these requirements is appropriate to ensure a level playing
field for all railway undertakings and the absence of distortion of competition in the
relevant market and take a decision thereof.’
This separation concept has provoked copious discussions between the stake-
holders. It appears that the initial proposal on the table did not provide for the
above-mentioned exceptions granting the possibility for integrated undertakings to
own both sides of the rail system, though with the relevant guarantees. Bundling is
perceived by the Commission and some governments as facilitating discrimination
leading to the possibility that infrastructure managers, who are mainly state-owned
entities, cross-subsidize the commercial activities, for instance, by diverting state
funds.80 However, separation is not itself a guarantee for competition, regulatory
bodies should be appointed to enforce the implementation of the legislation. A
typical example of how this can happen in practice is that of the SNCF being fined in
December 2012 for anticompetitive behaviour – using confidential information for
commercial purposes and attempting to prevent competitors from accessing the
freight and other markets through predatory pricing. Also, the possibility given to
Member States to prevent integrated operators from entering the market without
the clearance of the Commission is considered to be a possible deterrent to inves-
tors.81
Different commentators, however, maintain serious doubts about this strict
approach. According to Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, for example, after
analysing the situation in different third markets,
‘both the findings from data analysis and comments by CEOs, ministry officials
and experts in the study raise doubts as to whether the separation of infra-
79 See Commission SWD Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening of the
market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infrastructure, /
SWD/2013/012 final /, p. 10-11.
80 See https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/eu-monitoring/ministers-discuss-4th-railway-package.
81 T. Berkeley, Germany rewrites the Fourth Railway Package, available at http://www.railjournal.com/
index.php/blogs/tony-berkeley/germany-rewrites-the-fourth-railway-package.html.
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structure and transport services is the right way to increase intramodal
competition and railway performance. A viable alternative would be to facili-
tate intramodal competition in an integrated railway system. In this case, the
regulator would have to be able to use important levers to achieve rail compe-
tition, for instance by safeguarding third-party access and fair-track access
charges. Intermodal competition would remain a main driver for performance
and efficiency improvements at railways, as confirmed by the countries under
review.’82
For J. Drew and C. Nash,
‘academic literature provides no evidence that vertical separation leads to
efficiency gains although one study indicates that, if vertical separation is
necessary for introducing competition, it may increase efficiency indirectly. …
The analysis shows no correlation between vertical separation and the growth
in rail freight traffic or rail’s share of total freight traffic (two surrogate meas-
ures of attractiveness of rail services to customers which should reflect effi-
ciency and service quality). Indeed, if the key objective is to promote the effi-
ciency and growth of rail freight, vertical separation may in some circum-
stances, particularly those in some Central and Eastern European countries
where adequate government funding for infrastructure is not available,
impede rail growth. Also, despite the higher passenger growth in some coun-
tries which have introduced vertical separation, this cannot be attributed to
vertical separation.’83
Consequently, an integrated structure can enhance coordination of tracks and rolling
stock as well as efficiency, and that could be maintained by reinforcing the anti-
discrimination measures and enforcement, or by placing some functions such as allo-
cation and charges with a third body.84
Furthermore, here, too, the services of the European Parliament have underlined
substantial weaknesses in the impact assessment (IA):85
‘The IA seems to lack consistent references to robust evidence supporting the
reasoning, arguments and conclusions (for example, regarding the correlation
between the level of separation and alleged positive impacts on the intensity
of infrastructure use, investments in infrastructure and transport operations,
service quality etc). DG MOVE itself admits that “evidence used to support the
82 Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, The optimal setup of a rail system – Lessons learned from outside
Europe, 2012, p. 27.
83 J. Drew and C. Nash, Vertical separation of railway infrastructure – does it always make sense? Institute for
Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Working Paper 594, 2011, p. 59.
84 C. Nash, ‘Unravelling the Fourth Railway Package’, Railway Gazette International, November 2012.
85 Initial appraisal of a European Commission Impact Assessment Fourth Railway Package, May 2013, Doc.
507.508, p. 9.
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problem definition is mostly anecdotal” and expresses concern about compa-
rability of IM governance and efficiency and infrastructure access between
Member States and with other economies outside Europe (IA, p. 16). The
examples and case studies put forth in the IA lack thus assignability to all EU
countries. The Commission further recognizes that, due to constraints of
limited empirical evidence, of data access and measurability of benefits, “no
full cost benefit analysis can be provided” (IA Annex V, p. 109). The cost
benefit analysis in the annexes is thus based on estimates derived from case
studies on single countries and similar sectors and is therefore not generaliz-
able: “These figures should be treated with care, given the uncertainties
surrounding the estimations and differences between the sectors.” (IA Annex
V, p. 113) In addition, misalignment costs are not calculated with the argu-
ment that the establishment of coordination bodies foreseen in the proposal
will prevent those.’
Some trade unions have stressed that the fragmentation of employer responsibility
may lead to less safety for the workers, as less money would be invested in risk
control and maintenance. These concerns do not seem to be unsubstantiated, as
they have been the direct targets of some of the new provisions proposed for the
safety Directive.86
Anyway, it is important to notice that the Commission had already been obliged to
weaken its original project. Its draft directive regarding governance was based on a
strict separation between infrastructure and transport operators. Due to pressure
from various sources, and especially due to the Deutsche Bahn intervention relayed
by the German chancellor, this orientation was watered down in the final 2013
proposition.87
2.4. The legislative procedure until December 2014
The European Parliament Transport Committee (TREN) adopted on 16 December
2013 six reports concerning the related Fourth Railway Package Commission
proposals.88
86 In this framework, one must also recall that at the end of 2011 the Commission presented a series of
proposals on simplification of public procurement, which included a directive on public concessions. The
directive proposal aims to increase legal certainty and transparency, including an obligation to publish the
contracts above a certain threshold in the OJ, both in the works and services sectors (COM(2011) 897). See
Directive 2014/23/EN on the award of concession contracts (OJ 28.3.2014, p. 1-64).
87 See the interesting comments and references of A. Perier, ‘Le quatrième paquet ferroviaire: l’impossible
liberalization?’, Bruges Political Research Papers 33/2014, pp. 9-12.
88 Documents and information are available on the website of the European Parliament at this address: http:/
/www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/thematicnote.do?id=2056000&l=en.
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Meanwhile, the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the whole railway
package had been issued on 11 July 201389 and the opinion of the Committee of the
Regions on 7 October 2013.90
On 26 February 2014, the European Parliament Plenary adopted with several amend-
ments its first reading position on the legislative proposals of the package.91
According to the Parliament services, the amendments aimed to find a balance
between market opening and protecting PSOs, enhancing the protection of workers’
rights, creating a European vehicle registry, and laying down certain limits
concerning public service contracts. All operators should have access to rail infra-
structure; new operators should be given more opportunities to compete for public
service contracts; safety certification and vehicle authorization procedures should be
harmonized.92
In the technical pillar in particular, the proposed amendments to the Agency Regula-
tion aim to clarify the objectives of the Agency, extending its application regarding
certification to all staff entrusted with safety-critical tasks.
As far as the interoperability Directive is concerned, the Parliament underlined the
need to improve the interlinking and interoperability of the national rail networks, as
well as access for all. Concerning the granting of authorizations for placing vehicles
on the market, the Parliament proposed a single type authorization operation.
The Parliament’s proposal to amend the railway safety Directive clearly defines the
tasks and responsibility of the Agency and the national safety authorities (NSAs). The
Agency should become a one-stop shop for safety certificates. However, according
to the Parliament, for railway undertakings operating exclusively on isolated
networks within one Member State, safety certificates should also be granted by the
relevant NSA at the choice of the applicant.
Concerning the proposal to amend Regulation 1370/2007, the Parliament put the
accent on the social aspects of the reform, requiring the selected PSOs to grant
staff working conditions on the basis of binding national, regional or local social
standards, to respect collective agreement and ensure social standards. Similarly,
the Parliament proposed various amendments to the Commission proposal to
amend Directive 2012/34, entailing the strengthening of social provisions, social
dialogue and guarantees against social dumping.
89 Economic and Social Committee TEN/505, available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.ten-opin-
ions.27187.
90 Committee of the Regions, COTER-V-36, available at http://coropinions.cor.europa.eu/coropiniondocu-
ment.aspx?language=fr&docnr=27&year=2013.
91 European Parliament website; the document references are of the texts adopted at first reading are P7_
TA(2014)147 to P7_TA(2014)151, European Parliament website, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
oeil/popups/thematicnote.do?id=2056000&l=en.
92 European Parliament website, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/thematicnote.do?id=
2056000&l=en.
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Finally, for one of the most controversial issues – separation between infrastructure
management and rail undertakings – the Parliament suggested that, provided that
no conflict of interest arises and that confidentiality is guaranteed, Member States
should not be prevented from authorizing the infrastructure managers to engage in
cooperation agreements in a transparent, non-exclusive and non-discriminatory way
with one or more applicants for a specific line or a local or regional part of the
network. The Parliament considered that reciprocity should be a condition for
Member States required to open their market to undertakings established in third
countries.
The Commission expressed its open disappointment with the texts approved by the
Parliament; it affirmed that the new texts would limit effective competition. For
Commissioner Kallas, the Parliament Plenary’s vote was yet another demonstration
of the tenacity of vested national interests. According to the Commission, the Parlia-
ment adopted an unambitious stance that could put at risk the development of a
single European rail area. In particular, it criticized the fact that the compulsory
competitive tendering procedures for public service contracts had been postponed
to 2022 and had been subject to very significant exceptions. The amendments
adopted by the Parliament would also fail, for the Commission, to ensure an effective
independence of the infrastructure manager and financial transparency within verti-
cally integrated structures, – both of which are essential to ensure equal and non-
discriminatory access to the network.93
The Council had adopted three general approaches concerning solely the three
proposals of the technical pillar in June 2013 (interoperability),94 October 2013
(safety)95 and March 2014 (ERA) respectively.96
During the meeting of 5 June 2014, the Council approved a political agreement on
the three technical pillar proposals.97 The political agreement includes the general
approach texts previously agreed and encompasses some relevant Parliamentary
amendments.
In particular, the Council advocated a dual system for granting vehicle circulation
authorizations and safety certificates. The competent NSAs should remain in charge
of the procedures for rolling stock used exclusively for domestic transport. After a
93 European Commission Press Release, Transport: European Parliament adopts equivocal first reading posi-
tion on Fourth Railway Package, IP/14/192 26/02/2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-14-192_en.htm.
94 See Council Press Release 10457/1/13 REV 1, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/137408.pdf p. 20.
95 See Council Press Release 14602/13, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/trans/138961.pdf.
96 See Council Press Release 7665/14, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/trans/141522.pdf.
97 See Council Press Release Council reaches political agreement on railway interoperability and safety and
the European Railway Agency, 10401/14, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressdata/en/trans/143080.pdf.
THE EU’S FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE: A NEW STOP IN A LONG REGULATORY JOURNEY
30
transitional period of five years, the ERA will be competent in the procedures for
international railway transport vehicles. Both the NSAs and the Agency will take full
responsibility for the certificates issued. The Council provided for specific settlement
solutions in case of disagreement between an NSA and the Agency concerning the
assessment of an undertaking or of a vehicle.
The amended texts allow for the possibility that if a single safety certificate or a
vehicle authorization is not in compliance with the requirements for a safety
management system or for interoperability, they can be revoked by the Agency or
the NSA respectively. As for the TSI, the Council proposals include a generous list of
exceptions under which Member States can suspend TSI requirements. In addition,
the Council proposals provide more powers for the Agency concerning the examina-
tion of draft national rules on safety and interoperability and the monitoring and
audit of the NSAs. As per the governance, the Council introduced various amend-
ments, in particular concerning the role of the Management Board over the newly
introduced Executive Board, and provide for more flexibility in the establishment of
Boards of Appeals within the Agency.
Commissioner Kallas welcomed the adoption of a political agreement by the Council,
but he regretted that the Council had weakened the role of the ERA compared to the
Commission’s initial proposals, which sought to concentrate all the different tasks
and competencies in the hands of the Agency. He also regretted that the transition
period had been extended from two to five years.98
The Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council, in charge for the second
semester of 2014, indicated that it would encourage progress on the Fourth Railway
Package and promote a policy discussion in order to seek a common position among
Member States. The Presidency affirmed that it planned to negotiate with the Parlia-
ment over the technical pillar of the Fourth Railway Package and intended to pursue
a holistic approach to the whole package.99 Apparently, the Commission pushed the
Presidency to deal with the opening up of the domestic passenger market and the
governance of infrastructure as a single project and not separately.100
As of December 2014, no substantial advance in the legislative procedure seems to
have been achieved by the Italian Presidency. Starting from January, it has been
Latvia’s turn to lead the Council; it remains to be seen whether some progress, at
least concerning the technical pillar, will take place under the presidency of the Baltic
state.
98 European Commission Rail Transport: Simplifying procedures to achieve a single European railway area,
Press Release, IP/14/643 of 05/06/2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-643_
en.htm.
99 Europe, a Fresh Start, Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, available
at: http://italia2014.eu/media/1349/programma_en1_def.pdf.
100 Agence Europe, Bulletin No 11104 of 20 June 2013, available at http://www.agenceurope.com/danteweb/.
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3. ERA POWERS: PRESENT AND FUTURE
3.1. The present situation
The ERA was established by Regulation 881/2004/EC101 of 29 April 2004 and was
operational by mid-2006. Article 1 of the Regulation sets its objectives, which are to
contribute, on technical matters, to the implementation of the EU legislation aimed
at improving the competitive position of the railway and at developing a common
approach to safety on the European railway system, in order to contribute to
creating a European railway area without frontiers and to guarantee a high level of
safety. In pursuing these objectives, it will take account of the process of enlarge-
ment and of links with third countries.
In practical terms, the Agency was established to provide the EU Member States and
the Commission with technical assistance in the fields of railway safety and interop-
erability. This involves the development and implementation of TSIs and a common
approach to questions concerning railway safety. The Agency’s main task is to
manage the preparation of these measures.102
In addition, the Agency acts as the system authority for the European Rail Traffic
Management System (ERTMS) project, in the sense that it is responsible for the
organization and the process of the control management change, ensuring the
quality and completeness of the ERTMS specifications.
Regulation 881/2004/EC, which is currently in force, does not provide the Agency
with specific decision-making powers.103 The ERA is in fact only entitled to address
recommendations and to issue opinions to the Commission and the relevant national
regulatory bodies.104 The Commission implements the recommendations through a
Regulatory Committee involving the Member States.105 The Agency is conferred
mandates by the Commission, namely concerning the development and revision of
TSIs, common safety methods (CSMs), common safety targets (CSTs) and common
101 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 1-43.
102 See the Agency’s website://www.era.europa.eu/The-Agency/Pages/home.aspx.
103 Only a limited number of acts of the Agency can therefore be challenged in front of the CJEU. In
particular, the Court is competent to decide on any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded
by the Agency and on compensation for damage deriving from non-contractual liability (Art. 34). In addi-
tion, Art. 37 of the Regulation provides that the Agency shall be subject to Regulation 1049/2001
regarding public access to documents, and that it shall therefore be subject to the control of the
Ombudsman and of the CJEU according to the provisions thereof. To date, no legal challenge against
such acts by the ERA has been brought before the CJEU. Revealingly, for example, the conclusion of
agreements with third countries authorities has happened without any specific legal basis.
104 Art. 2.
105 See Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13-18).
THE EU’S FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE: A NEW STOP IN A LONG REGULATORY JOURNEY
32
harmonized requirements for safety certifications.106 It also cooperates with and
coordinates NSAs, and monitors the overall safety performance of the railway
system. The Agency is managed by its Executive Director and is provided with an
Administrative Board which is composed of Commission and national representa-
tives, and is assisted by interest-groups and a Norwegian representative. The Admin-
istrative Board adopts the general report of the Agency and its yearly work
programme, adopts the budget, establishes its rules of procedure and appoints the
Executive Director, over whom it exercises disciplinary authority.107 The Executive
Director represents and manages the Agency by preparing the work programme,
adopting instructions and orders, establishing a performance-assessment system,
preparing a report that is submitted to the Administrative Board, appointing staff,
preparing a draft statement on revenues and expenditure and implementing the
budget.108
3.2. The new proposed powers
The Commission proposals of January 2013 which constitute the Fourth Railway
Package and the technical pillar in particular, seek to introduce a considerable expan-
sion in the competencies and powers of the Agency. They intend to transform it into
a ‘one-stop shop’ mainly for the issuing of safety and interoperability-linked author-
izations for the whole EU, with the aim of making it easier to access the market on an
ideal common playing-field. The Agency should contribute to the creation and effec-
tive functioning of a single European railway area without frontiers, and to guaran-
teeing a high level of safety, while improving the competitive position of the railway
sector. The Agency’s powers are concerned with the amendments to the ERA Regula-
tion, the safety Directive and the interoperability Directive.
This reform now appears essential. In fact, for many decades, Europe has remained
the biggest market in the world for the railway industry.109 It has also remained quite
fragmented. During the last ten years, however, the growth of the Asian market has
been considerable, and it has now become the biggest in the world. Asian producers
have also begun to invest more in Europe. Consequently, the extreme fragmentation
of the European market has become increasingly costly. The railway industry
106 See Commission Decision of 9 February 2006 concerning mandates to the European Safety Agency for
developing technical specifications for interoperability under Directive 2001/16/EC and common safety
targets, common safety methods and common harmonised requirements for safety certification under
Directive 2004/49/EC (C (2006)124 final); Commission Decision of 13 July 2007 concerning a framework
mandate to the European Railway Agency for the performance of certain activities under Directives 96/48/
EC and 2001/16/EC (C (2007)3371 final); Commission Decision of 29 April 2010 concerning a mandate to the
European Railway Agency to develop and review Technical Specifications for Interoperability with a view to
extending their scope to the whole rail system in the European Union (C (2010)2576 final).
107 Art. 25.
108 Art. 22 and 30.
109 For a very good description, see Ecorys, Sector overview and competitiveness survey of the railway supply
system, 2012.
THE EU’S FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE: A NEW STOP IN A LONG REGULATORY JOURNEY
33
threatens to become a lot like the defence industry, with the inevitable shrinking
evolution. If the industry wants to survive in the long term, it must grow in scale.
Furthermore, it needs to develop its advantages. The European railway industry
‘has a number of key strengths which provide a comparative advantage in
non-EU countries. A great advantage of European rail electrification industry
is the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS).
The ERTMS is being implemented also outside the EU. Another selling point
relates to high integrated solutions, i.e., merging of vehicle technology with
intelligent track/signalling and optimum operations and service management.
In addition, EU suppliers have high qualified key components like brakes deliv-
ered by specialized, long term experienced suppliers. In infrastructure the EU
is leading in developing special long-life steel for rail, fastening systems and
turnouts and high quality concrete or plastic sleepers to keep maintenance
cost within limits and to guarantee safe operation.’110
3.2.1. The proposal to recast the Agency Regulation
According to the recast proposed Agency Regulation,111 the Agency is established as
a body of the Union with legal personality.112 The types of acts that the Agency can
adopt, in addition to opinions and to recommendations, are decisions – concerning
safety certificates, vehicle and vehicle type authorization and the putting into service
of trackside control-command and signalling subsystems – technical documents,
audit reports, guidelines and other non-binding documents.113 It will conduct an
impact assessment of its recommendations and opinions. More specifically, the
recommendations involve in particular TSIs, common safety methods that are
adopted by the Commission. The Agency will set up a limited number of working
parties for drawing up recommendations. When relevant, the social partners, or
freight customers and passengers, will be consulted. The Commission will be empow-
ered to adopt delegated acts concerning fees and charges in relation to the certifi-
cates and authorizations issued by the Agency.114
The Agency is entrusted, with a view to their reduction, with the task of examining
draft national rules and rules currently in force in the field of safety and interopera-
bility,115 while the Safety and Interoperability Directives establish the procedure for
their notification. If it considers that all the requirements are fulfilled, the Agency will
inform the Commission and the Member State concerned about its positive assess-
110 Ecorys, Sector overview and competitiveness survey of the railway supply system, 2012, p. 93.
111 COM(2013) 27 final.
112 Art. 2.
113 Art. 3.
114 Art. 73 and 74.
115 Art. 21 and 22.
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ment. When no action is taken by the Member State within two months, the
Commission, after having heard the reasons of the relevant Member State, may
adopt a Decision requesting it to modify the rule and in the meantime suspend its
application.
The same procedure will apply, mutatis mutandis, in cases where the Agency
becomes aware of any national rule, notified or not, being redundant or in conflict
with the CSMs, CSTs, TSIs or any other EU legislation in the railway field.116
The Agency also has the task of acting as the system authority for ERTMS,
maintaining its technical specifications to ensure its coordinated development in the
EU. The Agency will define, publish and apply the procedure for managing requests
for changes to those specifications. It will contribute to ensuring that ERTMS equip-
ment complies with the specifications in force and to ensuring that ERTMS-related
European research programmes are coordinated with the development of ERTMS
technical specifications.117 In addition, it will act as the system authority for the
telematics applications, being responsible for maintaining their technical specifica-
tions, in accordance with relevant TSIs.118
One chapter119 of the proposed regulation is dedicated to the monitoring tasks of the
Agency in relation to the Single European Area. In particular, the Agency should be
entitled to monitor and audit the performance and decision making of NSAs, which
it can also inspect. If the Agency finds that the NSA presents deficiencies concerning
its tasks related to safety and interoperability, it will prevent it from performing such
tasks and recommend appropriate steps. In the event that the NSA disagrees, or if it
takes no action within three months, the Commission may take a decision.
Besides NSAs, the Agency will monitor the notified conformity assessment bodies120
through assistance to accreditation bodies, audits and inspections. If the Agency
considers that one of these bodies presents deficiencies that could prevent it from
effectively performing its tasks in relation to railway safety and interoperability, the
Agency will adopt a recommendation requesting the relevant Member State to take
appropriate steps. In a case where the Member State disagrees with the recommen-
dation or takes no action within three months, the Commission may adopt an
opinion.121
The Agency will monitor the overall safety performance of the railway system and
the improvement of the interoperability. It will also collect relevant data on
accidents and incidents, with the contribution of the national investigation bodies.122
116 Art. 22 (5).
117 Art. 24-28, Recital 13.
118 Art. 19.
119 Chapter 7, Art. 29-31.
120 See infra, § 3.2.2, these are bodies in charge of conformity assessment activities regarding subsystems.
121 Art. 30.
122 Art. 31.
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A series of ‘other tasks’ of the Agency, provided by the proposal, include certification
of drivers, acting as the system authorities for registers and databases, establishing
networks of NSAs, investigating bodies and representative bodies in order to
exchange information, promote good practices and exchange data on railway safety
indicators. The Agency will be in charge of communicating, disseminating and
providing training to stakeholders and information on the railway legislation, devel-
oping standards and guidance. It will contribute to research activities, and to
promoting innovation. In addition, the Agency will provide technical assistance to the
Commission with the implementation of the legislation and the assessment of a rail
project for which EU financial support has been submitted.123 These ‘soft tasks’
already largely exist, but will be strengthened by a specific legal basis.
Another additional task, introduced by the recast proposal, is the possibility for the
Agency to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with super-
visory authorities, international organizations and the administrations of third
countries. Such agreements would be subject to prior discussion with the Commis-
sion and should not create legal obligations for the EU.124
Finally, the Agency may conclude cooperation agreements with relevant national
authorities, in particular NSAs, in relation to the safety certificates and vehicle
authorizations. The agreements may include contracting of some of the tasks of the
Agency to the national authorities, but are without prejudice to the overall responsi-
bility of the Agency for performing its tasks.125
3.2.2. Safety
The Commission proposal126 to amend the safety Directive 2004/49/EC aims to
develop the safety of the EU’s railways and improve access to the market for rail
transport services. It provides that the Agency will become the only body entitled to
grant the single safety certificates allowing access to the railway infrastructure to
railway undertakings, which should ensure a high level of railway safety and equal
conditions for all railway undertakings.
Safety certificates will be granted by the Agency on the basis of the evidence that the
railway undertaking has established its safety management system and meets the
requirements laid down in the TSIs and in the relevant legislation in order to control
risks and provide transport services safely on the network.127 The single safety certif-
icate will specify the type and extent of the railway operations covered. It will be valid
throughout the Union for equivalent operations. Certificates will be renewed at
123 Art. 32-39.
124 Art. 40.
125 Art. 69.
126 COM(2013) 31 final.
127 Art. 10.
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intervals not exceeding five years. The Agency will receive applications and decide
within four months. An application guidance document will publicly be available free
of charge.
Before any new service commences operation, the railway undertaking will notify
the relevant NSA with the documentation confirming compliance with safety
requirements. If the NSA finds evidence that one or more conditions are not met, it
will refer the matter to the Agency, which will take the appropriate measures,
including revocation of the certificate.128 As far as the infrastructure managers are
concerned, in order to be allowed to manage and operate rail infrastructure, they
will obtain a renewable safety authorization from their NSA.
The proposed amended Directive provides that each railway undertaking, infrastruc-
ture manager and entity in charge of maintenance should ensure that its contractors
and other parties implement risk control measures.129 It largely maintains the former
provisions providing for fair and non-discriminatory access of railway undertakings
and infrastructure managers to training facilities for train drivers and other staff.130
It also provides that each vehicle, before it is used on the network, will have an entity
in charge of maintenance assigned to it and that this entity will be registered in the
national vehicle register.131 The proposal requires Member States to lay down a
series of tasks that the NSA will be entrusted with by Member States. Among them:
authorizing the placing in service of the energy and infrastructure subsystems;
issuing, renewing, amending and revoking safety authorizations of infrastructure
managers; making sure that the interoperability constituents are in compliance with
the essential requirements provided in the interoperability Directive; supporting the
Agency in the issue, renewal, amendment and revocation of single safety certificates;
supervising the railway undertakings; and monitoring, promoting, and, where appro-
priate, enforcing and updating the safety regulatory framework. NSAs will cooperate,
together with the Agency, to ensure information for railway undertakings, particu-
larly concerning risks and safety performance, is shared.
As provided by the transitional provisions, NSAs will continue to grant safety certifi-
cates until two years after entry into force of the new text. Finally, the Agency is
asked to provide recommendations and opinions that may be taken into account
when the EU adopts measures pursuant to the Directive.
128 Art. 10.
129 Recital 7.
130 Art. 13.
131 Art. 14.
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3.2.3. Interoperability
The proposal for a recast Directive on the interoperability132 of the rail system within
the EU has the objective of achieving technical harmonization and facilitating,
improving and developing international rail transport services within the Union and
with third countries, and contributing to the progressive creation of the internal
market in equipment and services for the construction, renewal, upgrading and
operation related to the rail system.133 The revised Directive will apply to the entire
rail system within the EU, and the scope of the TSIs is being extended to cover the
vehicles and networks not included in the trans-European rail system.
The proposed Directive provides that the Agency will draft TSIs and their amend-
ments, along with relevant recommendations, according to a mandate conferred by
the Commission, which, in its turn, should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in
this regard.134 Each subsystem – defined as the structural or functional parts of the
rail system135 – will be covered by a TSI.136 The drafting, adoption and renewal of the
TSIs will take account of the opinion of the social partners and of the users. The TSIs
should be revised at regular intervals. When deficiencies are discovered in the TSIs,
they can be amended on the basis of drafts of the Agency; in case of urgency, the
Commission may adopt delegated acts which enter into force without delay.137 The
Commission, when adopting implementing acts, will be assisted by a comitology
committee.138
The proposal provides for a wide range of exceptions, according to which Member
States may allow the applicant not to apply one or more TSIs or parts of them. In
particular, this applies for a proposed new subsystem or part of it, for the renewal or
upgrading of an existing subsystem; for urgent preventive measures following an
accident or a natural disaster; for a new proposed subsystem or part of it when the
application of these TSIs would compromise the economic viability of the project.139
A whole chapter of the recast Directive is dedicated to interoperability constitu-
ents.140 Member States have the responsibility to ensure that these constituents
enable the interoperability and meet the essential requirements (as set out in Annex
III of the Directive) and that they are used in their area of use and are suitably
installed and maintained. Member States will not prohibit, restrict or hinder the
132 COM(2013) 30 final.
133 See Recital 3.
134 Art. 5.
135 Art. 2 (5).
136 The definition of ‘technical specifications for interoperability’ is, according to Art. 2(9) of the Directive
proposal, a specification adopted in accordance with this Directive by which each subsystem or part of a
subsystem is covered in order to meet the essential requirements and ensure interoperability of the rail
system.
137 Art. 5 and 47.
138 Art. 48.
139 Art. 7.
140 Art. 8-17.
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placing on the market of interoperability constituents where they comply with this
Directive. In particular, they may not require checks which have already been carried
out as part of the procedure of ‘EC-Declaration of conformity or suitability for use’.
Similarly, concerning the subsystems, the proposal provides that Member States
may not prohibit, restrict or hinder the construction, placing in service and operation
of structural subsystems constituting the rail system which meet the essential
requirements.141 Those covered by the EC declaration of verification will be consid-
ered interoperable and to meet the essential requirements. The Commission will
establish, by means of implementing acts, the verification procedures for subsystems
and the relevant templates, which will be assessed by the notified conformity assess-
ment bodies. The notified conformity assessment bodies are legal persons respon-
sible for conformity assessment activities; they are notified by ‘notifying authorities’
which are designated by Member States and have the full responsibility for the tasks
performed by such bodies.
Concerning the placing on the market and the placing in service of fixed installations,
such as the trackside control-command and signalling, energy and infrastructure
subsystems, they will be placed in service only if they are designed, constructed and
installed in such a way as to meet the essential requirements, and the relevant
authorization is received.142 NSAs have the responsibility of authorizing the placing
in service of the energy, infrastructure and trackside control-command and signalling
subsystems which are located or operated in the territory of their Member States.
The Agency shall grant “decisions authorising the placing in service of the trackside
control command and signalling subsystems located or operated throughout the
Union”.143 The Agency and the NSAs will cooperate in disseminating information
concerning the procedures to obtain the relevant authorization.
Likewise, the mobile subsystems such as the rolling stock subsystem and the on-
board control-command and signalling subsystem will be placed on the market only
if they are designed, constructed and installed in such a way as to meet the essential
requirements.144
In order to be able to place a vehicle on the market, a vehicle authorization for
placing on the market must be issued by the Agency.145 The applicant will produce a
file indicating evidence of the placing in the market of the mobile subsystem
composing the vehicle, and its compatibility with such subsystems and their safe
integration within the vehicle. The authorizations will be issued within a predeter-
mined, reasonable time, and, in any case, within four months; they will be valid in all
141 Art. 12
142 Art. 18.
143 Art. 18.
144 Art. 19.
145 Art. 20.
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Member States, and could also concern a series of vehicles. After authorization is
granted, vehicles should be registered in the European register of authorizations,
kept by the Agency. Railway undertakings can only place vehicles in service after they
have received the relevant authorization. The applicant may bring an appeal before
the Board of Appeal designated according to the Agency Regulation against decisions
of the Agency or its failure to act within the time limits.
The Agency will issue also vehicle type authorizations and provide detailed guidance
on how to obtain such authorization. When it issues a vehicle authorization, it will at
the same time issue a vehicle type authorization.146
Any vehicle placed in service in the EU’s rail system will carry a European vehicle
number (EVN) assigned by the NSA competent for the relevant territory, before the
first placing in service of the vehicle.147 Each Member State will keep a register of the
vehicles placed in service in its territory. The Agency will keep a register of authori-
zations to place vehicle types on the market.148
According to the proposal, the new Directive will be transposed two years after its
entry into force, and Member States may continue to apply the old provisions
concerning the placing in the market and in service for two years after entry into
force. In addition, authorizations for placing in service of vehicles which have been
granted during this period and all other authorizations granted prior to the entry into
force of this Directive, including authorizations delivered under international agree-
ments, will remain valid in accordance with the conditions under which the authori-
zations have been granted. However, the extension of such existing vehicle authori-
zations in order to operate on one or more networks not covered by their authoriza-
tion will be subject to the new provisions.149
3.2.4. The new organs
The proposal provides a modified administrative and management structure. The
new structure will comprise a Management Board, a newly created Executive Board,
an Executive Director and one or more Boards of Appeal.150
The Management Board will be composed of one representative from each Member
State and four representatives of the Commission, all with a right to vote, along with
six representatives of interest groups,151 without the right to vote, who are
appointed by the Commission. Each Member will be in charge for four years and can
146 Art. 22.
147 Art. 42.
148 Art. 43-45.
149 Art. 51.
150 Art. 42.
151 In particular: railway undertakings; infrastructure managers; the railway industry; trade unions; passengers
and freight customers.
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be renewed; each of them will have an alternate. The participation of representa-
tives of third countries may also be arranged. The Board will take its decisions at the
absolute majority of its members entitled to vote. It will elect a Chairperson from
among the representatives of the Member States and a Deputy Chairperson. The
Executive Director will participate in the meetings.152
Among the many functions of the Management Board, a few deserve to be cited: the
adoption by qualified majority of the annual work programme and of the budget of
the Agency, the adoption of the Annual Report, the establishment of the rules of
procedure, the appointment of the Executive Director and establishment of related
decision-making procedures, appointment of staff, the appointment of the members
of Executive Board and of the Board of Appeals.153
The above-mentioned work programme will identify the objectives of each activity;
it will be adopted, taking into account the opinion of the Commission, which is
entitled to make the Management Board re-examine it.154
A new organ introduced by the Commission proposal is the Executive Board. It will
prepare decisions to be adopted by the Management Board and assist the Executive
Director in their implementation. The Executive Board is entitled, in case of urgency,
to take certain provisional decisions. It will be composed of the Chairperson of the
Management Board, one representative of the Commission and four other members
of the Management Board, which appoints them for the same term of office as itself.
The Management Board will lay down its rules of procedure.155
The Agency will be managed and represented by its Executive Director, who will be
completely independent, and will be accountable to the Management Board. S/he is
the legal representative of the Agency and will adopt decisions, recommendations,
opinions and other formal acts. S/he is in charge of the administrative management
of the Agency and is responsible for, in particular, the implementation of the
decisions of the Management Board, for the drafting of the annual work programme
and of the strategic multi-annual work programme and their implementation, for the
drafting of the financial regulation and for the preparation of the annual report to be
submitted to the management board.156
152 Art. 43-46.
153 Art. 47.
154 Art. 48.
155 Art. 49.
156 Art. 50.
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3.2.5. The Board of Appeals
As explained in the proposal for the new Agency Regulation, its IA report157 provided
for the creation of an independent appeal body separate from the Agency. However,
it was considered that the solution already in place at the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) would be more appropriate, and it was decided to take inspiration
from the relevant provisions of the EASA Regulation.158
In particular, the proposal provides that any natural or legal person will be legiti-
mated to appeal to a Board of Appeals against a decision addressed to that person
by the Agency pursuant to its new certification and authorization powers. Once all
appeal procedures within the Agency have been exhausted, actions for the annul-
ment of such decisions may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European
Union.
A Board of Appeal should be composed of a Chairperson and two other members
appointed by the Management Board from a list of qualified candidates established
by the Commission. Its rules of procedure should be established by the Commission
after consultation with the Management Board. The appeals should not have a
suspensory effect. However, if the Agency considers that circumstances so permit, it
may suspend the application of the decision appealed against.159
The Parliament had suggested accentuating the independence of the members of
the Boards. The Council had proposed the possibility of having either permanent
Boards or Boards established on a case by case basis, and which, when deciding on
the disagreement between the Agency and the NSA, will act as arbitration authori-
ties.
3.3. The ERA in the general framework of the development of the 
EU Agencies
The creation of agencies has developed during the last two decades in the EU, mainly
with the purpose of integrating the European market for potentially dangerous
products, of creating a level playing-field for some technical sectors, or disseminating
and helping the implementation of EU policies in certain areas. There are now
around 30 agencies across the EU, and they have varied structures and powers.160
157 SWD (2013) 8 final.
158 The EASA ‘Basic Regulation’ 216/2008/EC, OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, provides for the establishment of a Board of
Appeals competent to decide on appeals against the decisions of the Agency concerning the certifications it
is empowered to issue. Its members are appointed by the Management Board from a list of qualified candi-
dates adopted by the Commission. The decisions of the EASA Board of Appeal may be challenged before the
Court of Justice.
159 Art. 51-57.
160 For a comprehensive overview, see M. Busoic, M. Groenleer and J.Trondal, Eds, The agency phenomenon in
the European Union, Emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making, Manchester University
Press, 2012.
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There was an attempt by the Commission to create a common framework for all of
these bodies through a proposal for an interinstitutional agreement in 2005,161
setting out the conditions for the creation of regulatory agencies. It was not
approved, mainly because the Council was not convinced that an interinstitutional
agreement would be the appropriate instrument for such a framework. It was
concerned that the legislature would then be bound by a procedure that is not
provided for in the Treaties.162
The possibility of delegating powers to the Agencies is limited by the necessity to
apply the Meroni doctrine, which takes its origin in the judgment of the ECJ of 23
April 1956 in Case 9/56.163 The Court stated in that judgment that it is only when
delegated powers are clearly defined and executive, and can, therefore, be subject
to strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating
authority, that they can be authorized, as they wouldn’t be able to appreciably alter
the consequences involved in the exercise of the powers concerned.164 Should the
proposals be approved, the ERA will be given direct decision-making power in a
technical field, which will presumably involve considerable investments, rendering it
a very important actor in a sector which is crucial for the real achievement of the
internal market.
In the field of transport, two other agencies, the European Maritime Safety Agency
(EMSA) and the EASA were established in 2002. While the former merely assists the
Commission in the initiative and implementation of EU maritime legislation and is
involved in dissemination activities,165 the latter has been endowed with more
extensive powers, which resemble in some ways those foreseen for the ERA. EASA’s
primary text is the ‘Basic Regulation’ for civil aviation, No 216/2008,166 which lays
down the framework criteria and objectives for its responsibilities. In particular, the
Basic Regulation confers on the EASA several sets of functions. It is entitled to formu-
late opinions, conduct inspections and investigations, assist the Commission in
preparing technical measures for the implementation of the Regulation, and to carry
out on behalf of Member States the functions ascribed to them by international
161 Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies,
COM(2005) 59 final, p. 2.
162 M. Chamon, ‘EU agencies: does the Meroni doctrine make sense?’, Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law. 2010, UGent 17(3). p. 281-305.
163 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity.Case 9-56. European Court Reports, p. 133.
164 Of course, reality is sometimes more nuanced. A higher degree of technicality may often strengthen the
agencies’ influence on the final decision of the Commission, even if those agencies possess only advice
powers. While being the accountable body, the Commission may not always possess the required capacity
and resources to operate an assessment on the technical findings of the Agencies. See: The agency
phenomenon in the European Union, cit., p. 105-127.
165 Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establishing a
European Maritime Safety Agency, OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 1.
166 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of 20/02/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a
European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/
2002 and Directive 2004/36/E, OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1, as lastly amended by Regulation 6/2013/EU.
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conventions. Most relevantly, the EASA issues certification specifications and accept-
able means of compliance, and prepares drafts for the Commission. It also issues, in
some circumstances, airworthiness and environmental certifications for products,
parts and appliances, and releases certificates for pilot and air traffic controller third-
country organizations. In addition, the EASA may take action with any problem
affecting the safety of air operations by determining corrective action and dissemi-
nating related information; it has a number of powers related to air traffic manage-
ment and air navigation services and the related certifications; it authorizes third-
country operators and may request the Commission to impose fines when the provi-
sions of the Basic Regulation and its implementing rules have been breached.167
It is not clear whether the new powers that will be granted to the ERA will mirror
those of the EASA and to what extent. It would in any case seem that the actual
intention of the EU legislative bodies is to deflate the ambitions of the initial Commis-
sion proposal. The higher caution concerning the powers to be delegated to the
Railways Agency compared to the EASA may be due, once again, to the structural
differences between the systems, the first being still very diversified from country to
country, while the second is more fitted to international transport and thus more
harmonized. Although this looks very much like a vicious circle, one can expect that
the powers of the ERA will be wider once the interoperability of the rail sector
reaches the ideal level where a centralized management of the certifications and
authorizations will be convenient for all.
167 See in particular Art. 17-27 of Regulation 216/2008.
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4. SUBSIDIES TO RAILWAY TRANSPORT SECTOR
4.1. The present regime
The peculiarities of the transport sector – namely its national monopolistic organiza-
tion and the lack of standardization – were acknowledged even at the time of the EEC
Treaty. In fact, the related Article 73 of the Rome Treaty is still unchanged and in
force; it is now Article 93 of the TFEU, and it provides for a special legal basis for the
assessment of state aid in the form of public service compensation in land transport.
It is worded as follows: ‘Aids shall be compatible with the Treaties if they meet the
needs of coordination of transport or if they represent reimbursement for the
discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service.’168
As was stated in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 156/77, Commission v
Belgium,169 aid to the transport sector is not exempted from the general system of
the Treaty concerning state aid, or from the controls and procedures laid down
therein; therefore it can be inferred that Article 93 TFEU is lex specialis to Article
106(2) TFEU and not to Article 107 TFEU.170 Consequently, Article 93 TFEU rules on
the compatibility of the state aid with the general Treaty provisions on the subject,
not on the mere existence of such aid. The Court therefore confirmed what had been
anticipated by the Commission in Decision 65/271,171 namely that competition rules
do apply to the transport sector. The Commission plays a very important role in this
field, mainly due to its margin of appreciation in assessing whether the criteria set in
Article 107 TFEU to consider state aid compatible with the internal market are met.
Occasionally, EU legislation has been even stricter on the transport sector than on
other sectors when it comes to the application of state aid provisions. Suffice it to
mention that the Commission notice on de minimis aid,172 which sets a threshold
figure of aid below which Article 107 can be said not to apply, does not concern trans-
port. Similarly, Regulation 69/2001173 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the
EC Treaty to de minimis aid does not apply to that sector either, since, as is explained
168 For an overview, see T. Maxian Rusch., S. Schmidt, ‘The post-Altmark Era Has Started: 15 Months of Applica-
tion of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 to Public Transport Services’, Eur. State Aid L. Q.; 2011, Vol. 10 Issue
2, p. 249; R. Bieber F. Maiani, M. Delaloye, Droit européen des transports, Bruylant 2006, p. 227-238; C.H.
Bovis, ‘Public Service Obligations in the Transport Sector: The Demarcation between State Aids and Services
of General Interest under EU law’, EBLR, 2005, p. 1331.
169 ECR (1978) 1881, Judgment of the Court of 12 October 1978, point 10: ‘l’application de l’article 77 du traité,
qui admet la compatibilité avec le traité d’aides aux transports seulement dans des cas bien déterminés et
ne portant pas préjudice aux intérêts généraux de la Communauté, ne peut avoir pour effet de soustraire
les aides aux transports au régime général du traité concernant les aides accordées par les États et aux
contrôles et procédures y prévus.’
170 See T. Maxian Rusch.; S. Schmidt, ‘The post-Altmark Era Has Started’, cit., p. 249.
171 Council Decision of 13 May 1965 on the harmonization of certain provisions affecting competition in trans-
port by rail, road and inland waterway, JO 1965, p. 1500.
172 Commission notice on the de minimis rule for State aid, C 068, 06/03/1996 P. 9-10.
173 OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 30-32.
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in Recital 3, there is a risk that even minor aid could fulfil the criteria established in
Article 107 of the TFEU.
The first action of the European legislator in the field of state aid to the transport
sector was the adoption of Regulations 1191/69,174 1192/69175 and 1107/70.176 The
former aimed to eliminate disparities liable to cause substantial distortion in the
conditions inherent in the concept of a public service which are imposed on transport
undertakings by Member States. The concept of PSO was clarified and classified as
an obligation to operate, to carry, and related to tariffs. Regulation 1191/69 required
the termination of all the PSOs, in so far as they did not comply with the definition of
being essential, in order to ensure the provision of adequate transport services. In
those cases, public service contracts could be concluded, in a way that is less costly
for the community, and the economic disadvantages undertaken by undertakings
carrying out public services should be compensated. State aid granted according to
such a provision was exempted from the obligation of prior notification from the
Commission. The Regulation did not apply to urban, local or regional undertakings.
Regulation 1192/69, on common rules for the normalization of the accounts of
railway undertakings, aimed to eliminate disparities which arise when public author-
ities impose financial burdens on, or grant of benefits to railway undertakings, as
opposed to other modes of transport – which are consequently liable to cause
substantial distortion in the conditions of competition. In particular, the normaliza-
tion of the accounts of railway undertakings, within the meaning of this Regulation,
consisted of: determination of the financial burdens or benefits undertaken by
specifically indicated railway undertakings by reason of any legal provision; compar-
ison with their position if they operated under the same conditions as other trans-
port undertakings; and, at a second stage, in the payment of compensation in respect
of the burdens or benefits disclosed by such determination.
The following year, Regulation 1107/70 on the granting of state aids for transport by
rail, road and inland waterway was adopted. The general intention of the Commis-
sion was to authorize coordination of transport only in those cases where such an
intervention is deemed necessary to grant services which could not be granted under
the market forces, either because the market does not exist or because competition
is distorted. Particularly important is the provision under Article 3 of the Regulation,
which required that, with the exception of what is provided by Regulations 1191 and
1192 of 1969, Member States will neither take co-ordination measures nor impose
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service in transport and which involve
the granting of aids pursuant to Article 93 TFEU, except in a number of cases specif-
ically indicated. Some of those cases were only valid until the entry into force of
174 OJ L 175, 23/07/1968 p. 1-12.
175 OJ L 156, 28/06/1969 p.8-20.
176 OJ L 130, 15/06/1970 p. 1-3.
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common rules on the allocation of infrastructure costs, or of Community rules on
access to the transport market. In 1991, Regulation 1191/69 was amended by
Regulation 1893/91,177 which introduced a detailed notion of public service contract.
Not much occurred in recent decades in terms of legal policy or enforcement
concerning state aid in the transport sector, probably as a consequence of both the
notification exemption and a lack of real competition in the European markets.
Some provisions of Directive 2012/34178 should be mentioned. In particular, Article
8 regulates the state financing of infrastructure managers; this is a provision that is
not intended to be amended by the Fourth Railway Package proposals. It provides
that, having due regard to Articles 93, 107 and 108 TFEU, Member States may
provide the infrastructure manager with financing which must be consistent with its
functions, the size of the infrastructure and financial requirements, in order to cover
new investments. Member States may decide to finance those investments through
means other than direct state funding. In any case, Member States will ensure that,
under normal business conditions and over a reasonable period which should not
exceed five years, the profit and loss account of an infrastructure manager will at
least balance income from infrastructure charges, surpluses from other commercial
activities, non-refundable incomes from private sources and state funding, on the
one hand, advance payments from the state, where appropriate, and infrastructure
expenditure, on the other hand. The provision concludes with some fairly hopeful
wording, stating that where rail transport is able to compete with other modes of
transport, Member States may require the infrastructure manager to balance his
accounts without state funding.
4.2. The CJEU case law
The landmark judgment in the sector of PSOs is the one given by the Court on 24 July
2003 in the Altmark case, C-280/00, delivered in response to a reference for a prelim-
inary ruling from the German federal administrative court. The case concerned local
bus transport companies, for which Germany made use of the provided exception
and did not apply regulation 1191/1969 to urban, suburban and regional transport.
Altmark being a licensee of the public authority, the renewal of its licence was
challenged by another operator who claimed that Altmark was not financially viable
since it could not have survived without public subsidies, and that the licenses were
therefore unlawful.
The Court was essentially asked whether the subsidies granted to Altmark were state
aid prohibited by the EC Treaty, and whether the German authorities violated EU law
177 OJ L 169, 29/06/1991 p. 1-3.
178 OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32-77.
THE EU’S FOURTH RAILWAY PACKAGE: A NEW STOP IN A LONG REGULATORY JOURNEY
48
in not applying the 1969 regulation on PSOs to regional transport services operated
commercially.
The Court stated that public subsidies intended to enable the operation of urban,
suburban or regional scheduled transport services are not caught by Article 107 of
TFEU when such subsidies are to be regarded as compensation for the services
provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge PSOs. For the purpose
of applying that criterion, the national courts have to ascertain that four conditions
are satisfied:
• first, the recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge PSOs and those
obligations have been clearly defined;
• second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated
have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner;
• third, the compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of
the costs incurred in discharging the PSOs, taking into account the relevant
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;
• fourth, where the undertaking that has to discharge PSOs is not chosen through
a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the
tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community,
the level of compensation needed has been determined on the basis of an anal-
ysis of the costs which a typical well run undertaking would have incurred in
discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a
reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.
The Court held that the German legislature may, in principle, make partial application
of the exception provided for in the Regulation for urban, suburban or regional trans-
port. However, this could only be accepted provided that the principle of legal
certainty is duly complied with, so as to make it possible to determine the situations
in which the exception applies and those in which the Community regulation is appli-
cable.
It added that, even though a measure may be considered as state aid because it does
not fulfil the above criteria, it can still be authorized by the Commission pursuant to
the criteria provided at Article 3 of Regulation 1107/1970, which lists exhaustively
the circumstances in which the authorities of the Member States may grant aids
under Article 93 TFEU.
Also remarkable is the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 16 March 2004 in
Case T-157/01, Danske Busvognmænd/Commission. In this case, the Court recalled
that Regulation 1191/1969 introduces a clear distinction between the ‘obligations
inherent in the concept of a public service’ which the competent authorities are to
terminate, and ‘transport services’ which those authorities are authorized to ensure
through ‘public service contracts’. Only in this latter circumstance may the common
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compensation procedures be applied. That scheme must then be limited to those
aids which are directly and exclusively necessary for the performance of the public
transport service per se, and do not include subsidies intended to cover deficits
incurred by the undertaking which benefited from the aids as a result of circum-
stances other than its task of providing transport, such as the consequences of
unsound financial management.179
In addition, the Tribunal noted that, following the adoption of Regulation 1107/70 on
the granting of aids for transport by rail, road and inland waterway, Member States
may no longer rely directly on Article 93 of TFEU in situations not covered by
secondary Community law, meaning Regulations 11961/1969 and 1107/1970.
The Commission, as a watchdog for the application of the Treaties, has been quite
active in recent years in investigating possible state aid in rail transport, in particular
concerning direct grants and asset transfers.
4.3. Regulation 1370/2007
Already in 2000, the Commission had submitted a proposal to modify the 1969 legis-
lation, which initially encountered several difficulties in obtaining the approval of the
Council and of the Parliament. Finally, after three modifications to the proposal, and
perhaps spurred by the legal uncertainty created by the Altmark and Danske Busvog-
nmænd judgments, an agreement was reached in 2007, and Regulation 1370/
2007180 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road was adopted,
repealing Regulation 1191/69 and 1107/70. The impact of this instrument on compe-
tition in the rail sector has, however, remained limited, due to the fact that it still
allows local authorities to provide public passenger transport services, and because
direct awards for railway passenger transport contracts find a legal basis here.
As stated in its explanatory memorandum,181 the starting point of the proposal for
this Regulation was the development of competition for the provision of public trans-
port. In the 1990s, 11 of the 15 Member States had introduced some elements of
competition into their legislation or administrative practices, relating to at least part
of their public transport market. In most cases it was some kind of controlled compe-
tition based on the regular renewal of exclusive rights, rather than free access to the
market. There was therefore a need to establish legal certainty and to harmonize key
aspects of the procedures used in different Member States. The Commission had
initially proposed the establishment of an explicit obligation for national authorities
to provide adequate transport services, which was not retained.
179 Points 77 and 86 in particular.
180 OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1-13.
181 COM/2000/0007 final – COD 2000/0212, OJ C 365 E, 19/12/2000 p. 0169-0178.
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Regulation 1370/2007 aims to clarify the requirements for national authorities so
that they can comply with Community law in providing, purchasing and financing
public passenger transport.182 In particular, national authorities that decide to grant
the relevant operator compensation or an exclusive right in return for its discharge
of a PSO should do so via a public service contract.183 As a derogation to this rule,
PSOs which aim to establish maximum tariffs for all or for certain categories of
passengers may also be the subject of ‘general rules’.184 These are defined by the
same Regulation as measures which apply without discrimination to all public
passenger transport services of the same type in a given geographical area for which
a competent authority is responsible.185 The regulation sets down the mandatory
content of public service contracts and general rules and sets a maximum duration
for the contracts, which is 15 years for transport.186
The Regulation in principle imposes an obligation to resort to public tendering for
public service contracts for passenger transport.187 However, this comes as a subsid-
iary rule, as substantial exceptions are provided. In particular, going far beyond the
initial Commission proposal, Article 5(6) provides that public service contracts can be
awarded directly when they concern transport by rail – unless they are prohibited by
national law – and for a maximum period of ten years. For the other modes of trans-
port, including metro and tramways, direct award is possible for contracts of
moderate volume, subject to specific thresholds. Direct award is also allowed in case
of immediate risk of disruption of passenger services.188 In addition, competent local
authorities are still free to provide passenger transport themselves, but then the
same entities providing such services will not participate in competitive tenders in
other domestic territories or in other Member States.189
Transparency rules have been introduced, for instance, public services contracts that
are to be tendered must be published.190 Decisions to award contracts must be
subject to review in case a third interest party so requests.191 If the public service
contract is awarded through public tendering, the Regulation requires the applica-
tion of criteria similar to those introduced by the Altmark judgment.192 In case of
general rules or direct awards, additional requirements are set in the Annex to the
Regulation, including the obligation to separate accounts.193
182 For an explanation of the provisions, see O. Grith Skovgaard, ‘Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger
transport services’, Public Procurement Law Review, 2008, 3, NA84-89.
183 Art.3 (1).
184 Art. 3(2).
185 Art. 2 (l).
186 Art. 4.
187 Art. 5(3).
188 Art. 5(5).
189 Art. 5(1) and (2).
190 Art. 7(2).
191 Art. 5(7).
192 Art. 6 and Art. 4(1).
193 Art. 6.
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The Regulation clarifies the relation between its provisions and state aid rules.194 In
particular, compensation paid in accordance with the Regulation does not constitute
state aid. Article 93 of TFEU still applies for other forms of compensation or financing.
As earlier noted, Member States are only required to gradually come into line with
the Regulation, the end of the transition period being fixed at 3 December 2019.
The Commission confirmed in its Community guidelines on state aid for railway
undertakings of 2008,195 that, after the entry into force of Regulation 1370/2007,
Article 93 of TFEU will again be directly applicable as a legal basis for establishing the
compatibility of state aid which does not come within the remit of the Regulation.
The first case regarding the application of this regulation is Andersen/Commission,
T-92/11, based on the same issue as Danske Busvognmænd. It is currently under
appeal before the Court of Justice as Case 303/13 P. In Case T-92/11 the General Court
annulled the Commission’s decision approving the state aid paid to the Danish incum-
bent railway company under public service contracts based on the fact that the appli-
cability of Regulation 1370/2007 should be excluded for aid which has been paid
without being notified, as the law in force at time of payment was Regulation 1191/69.
4.4. The new proposed amendments
The Fourth Railway Package provides for a proposal to repeal Regulation 1192/69
and for a proposal to amend Regulation 1370/2007, which are meant to enhance
competition and improve the operational efficiency and quality of passenger trans-
port service, and thus contribute to the main objective of establishing an internal
market for transport.
Regulation 1192/69 allows Member States to compensate 36 specific railway under-
takings for the payment of certain obligations, such as family allowances and
pensions, which undertakings operating other transport modes do not normally have
to support; the correct application of such rules exempts Member States from their
state aid notification obligations. Since this is now considered inconsistent and
incompatible with legislative measures currently in force, the Commission has issued
a proposal196 to repeal the Regulation. Such inconsistency and incompatibility are
due to a series of reasons. First of all, since railway undertakings must be managed
according to principles applicable to commercial companies, no state compensation
for insurance, pensions or other expenditures can be permissible. Then, the list of
undertakings eligible for compensation presupposes an integrated structure which is
incompatible with the principle of separation of essential functions and accounts and
implies discrimination among undertakings.197
194 Art. 9.
195 OJ C 184 22/7/2008. See also the new interpretative guidelines of 2014 (OJ C 92/1/2014).
196 COM(2013) 26 final.
197 Ibidem.
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The proposal198 to amend Regulation 1370/2007 aims to boost competition for
passenger transport by rail. It has to be recalled that the great majority of domestic
passenger services are provided under public service contracts and not under a
commercial basis.199
The proposal has to be read in connection with the proposed amendments200 to
Directive 2012/34, which introduces open access rights for railway undertakings and
strengthens the provisions on non-discriminatory access to the rail infrastructure.
The main innovations are the establishment of public tendering as the generally
applicable rule for rail transport, the establishment of an annual volume of public
services contracts for passengers by rail, the obligation for national authorities to
establish public transport plans according to specified requirements, to which the
PSOs should comply, and the clear definition of PSOs and of their geographical scope.
The proposal introduces competitive tendering as the general rule in the railway
sector.201 Competent authorities will have the possibility to choose between
competitive tendering and direct award only when the contracts present certain
limited annual values or a limited number of kilometres, values which are slightly
increased for small- and medium-sized undertakings.
Competent authorities should set out public transport plans to which the establish-
ment of PSOs and the award of public service contracts will be consistent.202 Such
plans should define the objectives of the public transport policy and the means to
implement them, covering all relevant transport modes for the territory for which
they are responsible. Specifications of PSOs for public passenger transport should be
appropriate and proportionate, without exceeding what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of the public transport plan. The assessment of appropriateness will take
account of whether a public intervention in the provision of passenger transport is a
suitable means of achieving the objectives, and take into account the cabotage
services.203 The authorities will prepare the specifications of PSOs in a cost-effective
manner, taking account of the compensation for the net financial effect of those
obligations; they need to ensure long-term financial sustainability of public transport
provided under public service contracts.204
The proposal establishes, albeit with a certain flexibility, a maximum annual volume
of passenger transport by rail under each public service contract, in order to facilitate
competition for such contracts.205 Further measures to enhance competition include
198 COM(2013)28 final.
199 Ibidem.
200 COM(2013) 29 final.
201 Art. 1 (4), amending Art. 5 (4) of Regulation 1370/2007.
202 Art. 1 (2), inserting Art. 2a of Regulation 1370/2007.
203 Art. 1(2), inserting paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 2a.
204 Art. 1(2), inserting paragraph 4 of Art. 2a.
205 Art. 1(2), inserting paragraph 6 of Art. 2a.
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the possibility for competent authorities to limit the number of contracts to be
awarded to the same railway undertaking following a competitive tendering proce-
dure, therefore inciting other undertakings to cover parts of the same network.206
Concerning rail rolling stock, the proposal introduces an obligation on Member
States to ensure effective and non-discriminatory access to suitable rail rolling stock
for operators wishing to provide public passenger services by rail.207 Where there are
no rolling stock leasing companies which provide such services in the relevant
market, Member States will ensure that the residual value risk of the rolling stock is
borne by the competent authorities in compliance with state aid rules. Competent
authorities have broad scope to choose the most appropriate ways of achieving the
objective; the details should be defined in implementing acts.
The transitional period to 2 December 2019, provided by the Regulation in its current
wording, will only refer to the obligation to organize competitive tendering proce-
dures and not to the other provisions provided in Article 5, which should be immedi-
ately applicable.208 In addition, the proposal introduces a further transitional period
for public service rail contracts that are directly awarded between 1 January 2013
and 2 December 2019, establishing that they may remain in place until they expire
and in any case no later than 31 December 2022.209
Other than in the fourth package, amendments to Regulation 1370/2007 are
included in a proposal210 to amend Regulation 994/98,211 which grants notification
exemption for certain categories of horizontal state aid. The amendment provides
that it will no longer be up to the Commission to grant notification exemptions for
public service compensation or for complying with tariff obligations, but the matter
should come within the scope of Regulation 994/98.
The proposal to amend Directive 2012/34212 aims to open the market for domestic
passenger transport services and therefore to improve competition. Nevertheless, it
leaves Member States the possibility of limiting access rights for the purpose of
operating domestic or international services if the exercise of this right would
compromise the economic equilibrium of a public service contract. It will be up to the
regulatory bodies to determine if this is the case, according to common procedures
and criteria.213
206 Art. 1(4), amending Art. 5(6) of Regulation 1370/2007.
207 Art. 1(5), inserting Art. 5a of Regulation 1370/2007.
208 Art. 1(8), amending Art. 8 of Regulation 1370/2007.
209 Ibidem.
210 COM(2012) 730 final, Art. 2, repealing Art. 9 of Regulation 1370/2007.
211 OJ L 142, 14.5.1998, p. 1-4.
212 COM(2013) 29 final.
213 Art. 1(5), amending Art. 10 of Directive 2012/34.
55
CONCLUSION
The construction of a European rail market, though potentially one of the most
important means for the achievement of the internal market and for the limitation
of environmental damage, has taken a very long time to develop, mainly due to struc-
tural characteristics which basically consisted of network economies, national
monopolies and a lack of interoperability between the national systems. This is why
EU action in this sector has only gradually required Member States to open their
undertakings to a commercial way of operating, to be subject to competition and
state aid rules, and to open the internal market in general. In addition, the legislation
has been characterised by a system of copious exceptions and temporary measures
for the entry into force of the new provisions.
Notwithstanding the governments’ lack of enthusiasm about giving up control of the
national rail systems, big developments have been registered since the beginning of
European integration in the rail transport sector. Action was taken in particular in
three directions: improvement of competition, improvement of interoperability
through the application of common standards, development of infrastructure. Liber-
alization has been promoted through the separation of the management of infra-
structure from the operation of services, the consequent application of commercial-
like business, the financial equilibrium of the business plan and the introduction of a
clear set of provisions on the compatibility of Member States’ financial measures
with the state aid principles. Interoperability actions have been backed by safety
standards, harmonization and improvement.
The fourth package aims to give this a new impulse. Once the internal market has
been fully established in this sector, a next step could be the introduction of struc-
tures that are created on a European level from the outset, or the gathering of
European undertakings, mirroring what is in place in the air transport sector, with the
various airline associations.
It is in any case desirable that, both on the freight and on the passenger segment, a
modal shift to the use of rail transport will occur in the very near future, if only
because of safety and, mostly, environmental reasons. Unfortunately, from this
point of view, the EU railway policy remains far from complete, and somewhat unbal-
anced. The EU has demonstrated more abilities to adopt measures about railway
transport itself than about its global environment. Firstly, externalities have not fully
been reflected in the comparative prices of road, air and rail transport until now.
Secondly, there is no global vision about infrastructure charges. Thirdly, the defini-
tion of performance itself in railways remains somewhat haphazard.
Finally, all this raises fundamental questions. What is the real added value of railways
in a general transport system? Or, put otherwise, in the railway transport service,
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what is the separate value of transport itself, comparative security, comfort, health
and environmental benefits? And once this is defined, what are the optimal forms of
public intervention in this imperfect competition sector? Though many measures
have been adopted over the last 25 years, very important actions – which have
enormous consequences for the relative competitiveness of railways – still remain to
be carried out. Whatever happens at the end of this legislative procedure, the Fourth
Railway Package will certainly be an important stop in this long regulatory journey,
but not the last one.
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APPENDIX: EU REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 
RAILWAY TRANSPORT
Railway packages
First Railway Package of 2001 (recast by Directive 2012/34/EU):
• Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2001 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of
the Community’s railways.214
• Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway
undertakings.215 216
Second Railway Package of 2004
• Directive 2004/49/EC of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community’s railways and
amending Council Directive 95/18/CE on the licensing of railway undertakings
and Directive 2001/14/CE on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and
the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certifica-
tion.217
• Directive 2004/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-
European high-speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-European
conventional rail system.218
• Directive 2004/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the
Community’s railways.219 Repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU.
• Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29
April 2004 establishing a European Railway Agency.220
Third Railway Package of 2007
• Directive 2007/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 October 2007 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of
214 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 1-25.
215 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 26-28.
216 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 29-46.
217 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 44-113.
218 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 114-163.
219 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 164-172.
220 OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 1-43.
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the Community’s railways and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infra-
structure.221 Partially repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU.
• Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 October 2007 on the certification of train drivers operating locomotives and
trains on the railway system in the Community.222
• Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport
services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69
and 1107/70.223
• Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and
obligations.224
• Regulation (EC) No 1372/2007 of 23 October 2007 amending Council Regulation
(EC) No 577/98 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in the
Community.225
Recast of First Railway Package in 2012
• Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
November 2012 establishing a single European railway area (recast).226
Regulatory bodies (Repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU)
• Directive 2001/14/EC of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infrastruc-
ture capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and
safety certification.227 Repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU.
• Directive 2001/12/EC of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 91/440/
EEC on the development of the Community’s railways.228 Repealed by Directive
2012/34/EU.
• Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Commu-
nity’s railways.229 Repealed by Directive 2012/34/EU.
ERTMS – European Rail Traffic Management System
• 2012/696/EU: Commission Decision of 6 November 2012 amending Commission
Decision 2012/88/EU on the technical specifications for interoperability relating
221 OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 44-50.
222 OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 51-78.
223 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p. 1-13.
224 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p. 14-41.
225 OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p. 42-43.
226 OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 32-77.
227 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 29-46.
228 OJ L 75, 15.3.2001, p. 1-25.
229 OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25-28.
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to the control-command and signalling subsystems of the trans-European rail
system.230
• 2012/88/EU: Commission Decision of 25 January 2012 on the technical specifica-
tion for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsys-
tems of the trans-European rail system (notified under document C(2012)
172).231
• 2011/229/EU: Commission Decision of 25 January 2012 on some technical speci-
fication for interoperability.232
• 2009/761/EC: Commission Decision of 22 July 2009 amending Decision 2006/
679/EC as regards the implementation of the technical specification for interop-
erability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-
European conventional rail system [C(2009) 5607 final] (also referred to as ‘the
European Deployment Plan’).233
• 2008/386/EC: Decision of 23/04/2008 modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/
EC of 28 March 2006 concerning the technical specification for interoperability
relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European
conventional rail system and Annex A to Decision 2006/860/EC of 7 November
2006 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the
control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high speed rail
system.234 Repealed by Decision 2012/88.
• 2007/153/EC: Decision of 6 March 2007 modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/
679/EC concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the
control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European conventional
rail system and Annex A to Decision 2006/860/EC concerning the technical spec-
ification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling
subsystem of the trans-European high speed rail system.235 Repealed by Decision
2012/88.
• 2006/860/EC: Decision of 07/11/2006 concerning a technical specification for
interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the
trans-European High Speed rail system and modifying Annex A to decision 2006/
679/EC of 28 March 2006 concerning the technical specification for interopera-
bility relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-
European conventional rail system.236 Repealed by Decision 2012/88.
230 JO L 311,10.11.2012, p. 3-13.
231 OJ L 51, 23.2.2012, p. 1-65.
232 OJ L 99, 14.03.2011, p. 1-99.
233 OJ L 194, 25.7.2009, p. 60-74.
234 OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, p. 11-17.
235 OJ L 67, 7.3.2007, p. 13-17.
236 OJ L 342, 7.12.2006, p. 1-165.
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• Communication on the deployment of the European rail signalling system
ERTMS/ETCS [COM(2005)298].237
• Annex to the Communication [SEC(2005)903].238
• 2001/260/EC: Decision of 21 March 2001 on the basic parameters of the command-
control and signalling subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system
referred to as ‘ERTMS characteristics’ in Annex II(3) to Directive 96/48/EC.239
Interoperability Directive
• Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast).240
Cross acceptance of rolling stock
• Commission Directive 2009/131/EC of 16 October 2009 amending Annex VII to
Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the inter-
operability of the rail system within the Community (Text with EEA relevance).241
Telematic applications
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 328/2012 of 17 April 2012 amending Regulation
(EC) No 62/2006 concerning the technical specification for interoperability
relating to the telematic applications for freight subsystem of the trans-European
conventional rail system Text with EEA relevance.242
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 454/2011 of 5 May 2011 on the technical speci-
fication for interoperability relating to the subsystem ‘telematics applications for
passenger services’ of the trans-European rail system.243
• Commission Regulation 62/2006 concerning the technical specifications for inter-
operability relating to the telematic applications for freight subsystem of the
trans-European conventional rail system was adopted on 23 December 2005 and
published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 18 January 2006.244
Safety Legislation
• Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the
common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regu-
lation (EC) No 352/2009 Text with EEA relevance.245
237 Not published in the OJ.
238 Not published in the OJ.
239 OJ L 93, 3.4.2001, p. 53-56.
240 OJ L 191, 18.7.2008, p. 1-45.
241 OJ L 273, 17.10.2009, p. 12-13.
242 OJ L 106, 18.4.2012, p. 14-19.
243 OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 11-67.
244 OJ L 13, 18.1.2006, p. 1-72.
245 OJ L 121, 3.5.2013, p. 8-25.
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• 2012/226/EU: Commission Decision of 23 April 2012 on the second set of
common safety targets as regards the rail system (notified under document
C(2012) 2084) Text with EEA relevance.246
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 of 10 May 2011 on a system of certifi-
cation of entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons and amending
Regulation (EC) No 653/2007.247
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 1169/2010 of 10 December 2010 on a common
safety method for assessing conformity with the requirements for obtaining a
railway safety authorisation.248
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 1158/2010 of 9 December 2010 on a common
safety method for assessing conformity with the requirements for obtaining
railway safety certificates.249
• Commission Decision 2010/409/EC of 19 July 2010 on Common Safety Targets as
referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council.250 Repealed by Decision 2012/226.
• Commission Directive 2009/149/EC of 27 November 2009 amending Directive
2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Common
Safety Indicators and common methods to calculate accident costs.251
• Commission Decision 2009/460/EC of 5 June 2009 on the adoption of a common
safety method for assessment of achievement of safety targets, as referred to in
Article 6 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council.252
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 of 24 April 2009 on the adoption of a
common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment as referred to in
Article 6(3)(a) of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council.253 Repealed by Implementing Regulation 402/2013.
• Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2008 amending Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the Community’s
railways (Railway Safety Directive).254
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 653/2007 of 13 June 2007 on the use of a
common European format for safety certificates and application documents in
accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and on the validity of safety certificates delivered under Direc-
tive 2001/14/EC.255
246 OJ L 115, 27.4.2012, p. 27-34.
247 OJ L 122, 11.5.2011, p. 22-46.
248 OJ L 327, 11.12.2010, p 13-25.
249 OJ L 326, 10.12.2010, p. 11-24.
250 OJ L 189, 22.7.2010, p. 19-27.
251 OJ L 313, 28.11.2009, p. 65-74.
252 OJ L 150, 13.6.2009, p. 11-19.
253 OJ L 108, 29.4.2009, p. 4-19.
254 OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 62-67.
255 OJ L 153, 14.6.2007, p. 9-24.
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Environment
• Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No
67/2010 Text with EEA relevance.256
• 2011/229/EU: Commission Decision of 4 April 2011 concerning the technical
specifications of interoperability relating to the subsystem ‘rolling stock – noise’
of the trans-European conventional rail system (notified under document
C(2011) 658) Text with EEA relevance.257
• Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community (Recast)
(Text with EEA relevance).258
• 2006/66/EC: Commission Decision of 23 December 2005 concerning the tech-
nical specification for interoperability relating to the subsystem rolling stock —
noise of the trans-European conventional rail system (notified under document
number C(2005) 5666) (Text with EEA relevance259). Repealed by Decision 2011/
229.
• 2002/735/EC: Commission Decision of 30 May 2002 concerning the technical
specification for interoperability relating to the rolling stock subsystem of the
trans-European high-speed rail system referred to in Article 6(1) of Directive 96/
48/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2002)
1952).260
The European Rail Network for Competitive Freight
• Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 concerning a European rail network for competitive
freight.261
Workers’ rights
• Council Directive 2005/47/EC of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the
Community of European Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’
Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers
engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector.262
256 OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 129-171.
257 OJ L 99, 13.4.2011, p. 1-39.
258 OJ L 191, 18.7.2008, p. 1-45.
259 OJ L 37, 8.2.2006, p. 1-49.
260 OJ L 245, 12.9.2002, p. 402-506.
261 OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 22-32.
262 OJ L 195, 27.7.2005, p. 15-17.
